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This thesis consists of three chapters, each of which is a self-contained analysis of a distinct
theoretical setting. The chapters are linked by the overarching theme of choices about infor-
mation structures. In each, I consider an agent or agents facing a choice about information
provision, modelled as the selection of an information structure that determines the proba-
bility of a receiver observing particular messages, given particular states of the world being
realised.
Chapter 1: Confirmation Bias and Markets for Information
If consumers of information suffer from confirmation bias, they may prefer a biased infor-
mation source to a perfectly accurate one. This is a potential explanation for the existence
of biased reporting in news media. I show how confirmation bias can be expressed in terms
of utility derived directly from the relationship between a consumer’s prior and posterior
beliefs, and that this can induce preferences over signals. I derive the optimal signal for con-
sumers, both when their preferences are entirely dictated by confirmation bias, and when an
instrumental value of information is also present, showing that in each case consumers may
prefer biased signals. When audience-maximising firms compete to offer information sources
to consumers with these preferences, I show that the strategic environment is equivalent to
a one-dimensional location game, and that results analogous to those in the existing litera-
ture on location games extend to this setting: in duopoly, the firms locate at the median of
consumer preferences, but ‘spread out’ as the number of firms rises.
Chapter 2: How Informed should Voters be?
Ex ante identical agents participate in a simple majority vote on whether to adopt a new
policy, of uncertain value to each agent. A utilitarian social planner chooses the information
structure through which agents learn about their own IID, private valuations of the policy.
With mandatory voting, perfect information is optimal if and only if a particular symmetry
condition holds on the distribution of valuations. Otherwise, restricting information such that
relatively-ambivalent voters sometimes make mistakes can increase total expected utility, by
reducing the incidence of ‘tyranny of the majority’ outcomes. When indifferent voters are
allowed to abstain, perfect information becomes non-optimal for symmetrical distributions
as well, provided that the number of voters is sufficiently large.
Chapter 3: Information Sharing in Continuous Two-Player Games
Two ex ante identical agents with uncertain payoff types play a two-stage game. In the
first stage, before learning their own payoff type, they select an information structure for
their opponent; they may choose to reveal their payoff type to their opponent, conceal it,
or partially reveal. Each player then draws one of two possible payoff types, observes their
own type, and receives a message about the opponent’s type generated by the structure
their opponent chose in the first stage. In the second stage players choose actions from an
interval. Payoffs depend only on the second stage actions (in which they are continuous)
ii
and a player’s own type. This framework encompasses versions of models in the literature
on information sharing in oligopoly, extending them to allow for ‘persuasive’ information
sharing rather than simply choosing revelation or concealment (or adding unbiased noise).
I show how this clarifies existing results, by laying out the incentives to provide a more or
less informative signal as marginal effects. This sheds some light on the known difference
between Cournot and (differentiated) Bertrand competition when considering sharing of cost
information (revelation in Cournot, concealment in Bertrand), which I show results from the
fact that in Bertrand competition, there is a direct, cost-dependent impact of the opponent’s
action on a player’s payoff that is not mediated through the player’s own action. I also
provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium in games of this type, and analyse
some alternative second stage games, showing that there exist games and forms of payoff
uncertainty for which multiple equilibria of the overall game exist, including equilibria with




The papers that make up this thesis are all concerned with the factors determining choices
about the provision of information. To be more specific, they are concerned with information
structures, in the sense that these are choices about how people are informed which are
made before the information is known to the decision-maker. The decision-maker is not
discovering some information and then choosing whether to reveal it or distort it - they are
‘locking in’ choices about how precise and/or biased the information someone receives will
be, without knowing for sure what the reality will turn out to be. Crucially, in all cases those
who receive the information do understand the information structures themselves. They
know if an information source is biased or inaccurate, and judge the information it provides
accordingly. This puts constraints on what the decision-maker who chooses the information
structure can achieve. To take an example from Chapter 3, say a firm is going to develop a
production process for a new product and can choose whether to have a third party conduct
that research publicly, revealing its cost of production to its competitors, or to conduct the
research privately in-house. If the firm wants to convince its competitors its cost of production
is low, and cannot convincingly do so by reporting its in-house research (because it is too
easy to misrepresent, so the competitors would not trust it), choosing third-party research
can do this, but only when the firm’s costs actually turn out to be low - the downside of the
competitors being convinced in this case is that if the costs turn out to be high, they will
know that and the firm will do less well in the market. This kind of trade-off is typical of the
considerations a decision-maker faces when choosing between information structures - for a
structure to be more convincing, it must also be more accurate.
Each of the chapters that follow considers what determines these choices in a particular setting
- information for confirmation-biased consumers, information for voters, and information
shared between decision-makers who interact with each other (like multiple firms facing the
cost-information problem described above).
Chapter 1 considers the preferred information structures of people who are confirmation-
biased - that is, they like to receive information that confirms and strengthens their existing
beliefs, and dislike information that shows that their existing beliefs might have been wrong.
I show that if they care mainly about whether information confirms or disconfirms their
beliefs, over how strongly it does so (i.e. if a piece of information confirms their belief twice
as strongly as another piece, they like it more, but not twice as much more), and are not
either very confident or not very confident at all in their existing belief, then the information
structures they most prefer will:
• be very accurate when their existing beliefs turn out to be true, always reporting the
truth in that case
• be less accurate when their existing beliefs turn out to be false, sometimes reporting
the truth, but sometimes reporting what they wanted to hear instead.
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This makes ‘good news’ more likely than if the information structure was perfectly accurate all
of the time, but it still allows them to get some amount of confirmation from the information
they get - if the source reported what they wanted to hear all the time, then knowing that,
their beliefs would not get any confirmation from the reports.
I also analyze the behaviour of media firms who compete to offer information sources to these
kinds of consumers, when the consumers start out with varying initial beliefs about which
of two possible outcomes is more likely. This means the consumers want different degrees of
bias from their media sources. I show that when there are only two firms, they would both
offer similar biases, around the median of what the different consumers would prefer. This
could mean accurate reporting if there are an equal number of consumers with biases one way
or the other, but if the majority of consumers start off skewed toward one possibility, then
the median point that the firms choose will be a biased one. With more firms, the available
choices will ‘spread out’ to cover the range of biases that different consumers demand.
Chapter 2 considers the optimal choice of information structures for voters in a two-option
vote, when the voters have independent preferences. This means that even when well-
informed, the voters may prefer different options, because they care about different things.
In this case, voting as a decision-making method has problems with ‘tyranny of the majority’
outcomes. These outcomes involve the relatively-slight preferences of a majority overruling
the strong preferences of a minority. If people could agree before finding out what their
preferences are (say, before anyone knows what the likely impacts of some policy decision
will be) to prevent these outcomes by allowing strength of preferences to be considered in
choosing an outcome, they would, even if they are self-interested, because of the risk that
they would end up being the ones in the harmed minority. However, this may not be possi-
ble, either because the majority vote decision-making system is determined by existing social
norms and practices and hard to alter, and/or because it is not possible to determine the
strengths of preferences, in particular because people have an incentive to exaggerate when
that information is taken into account in decision-making.
I show that in these cases, providing perfect information to voters that allows them to
determine precisely which outcome they would prefer may actually be harmful, by increasing
the impact of ‘tyranny of the majority’ outcomes. It may instead be optimal to provide
enough information to ensure that those who have strong preferences one way or the other
are aware of it and vote for their preference, but to allow those who are relatively-ambivalent
(i.e. those who would need very fine-grained and precise information to determine precisely
which outcome they prefer) to make ‘mistakes’, because this can reduce the risk of their
determining the outcome when it causes significant harm to those with stronger preferences.
This is particularly the case when voting is not mandatory and ambivalent voters can abstain
from voting, in which case it is typically optimal to let the most ambivalent voters abstain
rather than devote resources to providing the precise information that would cause them to
choose one way or the other based on a small degree of preference.
Chapter 3 considers situations in which two agents (people or firms) who are going to strate-
gically interact in some way - competing in a market, for example - can choose whether the
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other agent can gain information about their own motivations and payoffs. They make this
decision before they learn that information themselves, and before the strategic interaction
takes place. One example of this is the situation I described at the beginning of this summary,
in which firms decide whether their competitor will also be informed about their costs.
I set out a class of strategic interactions (games) for which I prove that an equilibrium
(mutually-optimal solutions for all agents) of the information-sharing problem exists, and
analyze how that equilibrium depends on the kind of strategic interaction the agents are
going to have. I show that incentives to share or conceal information depend on two effects
- how changing the information the other agent gets will change what they do, and how the
agent making the decision’s likely preferences about what the other agent does change if the
information the other agent is getting changes. Remember that with information structures,
the only way to make information suggesting that the first agent has some particular prefer-
ences more convincing for the other agent is to make it more likely that the first agent actually
does have those preferences when that information is sent. That means it matters whether
the first agent benefits more or less from convincing their opponent when they actually do
have those preferences than when they have other possible preferences.
This helps to explain existing results about the example with firms sharing cost information.
If firms produce substitute (competing) goods and compete on quantity, treating the market
price as fixed, then they always want to convince competitors that they have low costs.
However, the benefit they get from this is higher when they do actually have low costs,
because when they produce more goods, they get more benefit from a competitor reducing
its production level. This leads firms to want to reveal cost information - it is worth revealing
that their costs are high when that occurs, because the benefit to revealing that their costs
are low when that occurs is relatively large. On the other hand, when firms compete on
price, they want competitors to believe that their costs are high, because the competitors
then expect a higher price from the firm and raise their own prices accordingly, leading to
more demand for the firm’s product. However, this benefit is smaller when the firm’s cost is
actually high, because then they charge a higher price and produce less, so they benefit less
from their competitors raising prices. This leads firms to want to conceal cost information.
In addition to these cases, I also consider some other types of uncertainty, and show that
as well as fully concealing or fully revealing information, it is possible for agents to choose
partially-revealing information structures that provide some information but not perfect ac-
curacy. This does not happen with information about costs as described above, but it could
happen if the information concerned which ‘direction’ the agent would like their opponent
to change their behaviour in - for example, whether a firm would benefit from a competitor
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Chapter 1
Confirmation Bias and Markets for
Information
1.1 Introduction
Since the mid-2000s, a variety of authors have constructed models in which information
providers (in particular, media firms) might bias or ‘slant’ the information they provide. The
discussion has been driven by public suspicion of media reporting in the United States; Pew
Research Center (2017) provides evidence of widespread belief in media bias among the US
public, at least as regards politics. Evidencing actual bias, rather than the belief in it, is
difficult without relying on a common premise as to ‘the facts’ of any particular event, but
it is easier to support the claim that the bias of different information providers differs in
direction or degree. In that case, one can simply demonstrate that different sources report
differently, without having to take a position1. Groseclose and Milyo (2005) attempt to do this
quantitatively, based on the sources different outlets cite. They find considerable variation
across different US media outlets. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) take the simpler approach of
demonstrating variation by quoting notably different reports of the same events from different
outlets. To step away from the US for a moment, Smith (2017) demonstrates that this picture
of varying political biases matches public perceptions of the UK newspaper market. Here
beliefs about the political slants of the various newspapers were not strongly dependent on
the beliefs of the respondents themselves; consumers of different political affiliations might
differ in their assessments of the degree of bias of different sources, but there was consensus
on the direction (i.e. which papers lean left and which right).
1The fact of different sources reporting differently is not conclusive evidence of the existence of bias.
Different sources could have access to different information, leading to varying reports without deliberate
bias. Given the existence of news agencies and the informational resources available to modern media
organisations, this is not a compelling explanation for variation in reporting, although there are particular
circumstances in which it is more likely to apply: breaking news, for example.
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While an economist’s first instinct might be to argue that market competition should elimi-
nate biased reporting (Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) call this the ‘traditional conception
of the demand for news’), there has been no shortage of potential explanations for how bias
might originate and persist. In this paper, I develop a model in which consumers have a
preference for biased information sources, which, naturally enough, can lead firms to provide
them. The source of this preference is confirmation bias on the part of the consumers. This
psychological concept is something of an umbrella term for a collection of phenomena that
all involve some kind of bias towards maintaining pre-existing beliefs; Nickerson (1998) pro-
vides a breakdown, along with details of empirical evidence for each of the different forms of
confirmation bias he identifies. I am concerned with what Nickerson refers to as ‘Hypothesis-
determined Information Seeking’, meaning a tendency to seek out information that confirms
beliefs already held and avoid information that contradicts them2.
This relates naturally to the concept of selective exposure from Communication Studies,
meaning a tendency to choose to consume information matching pre-existing beliefs, and/or
to avoid information contradictory to them. Historically, assessments of the empirical evi-
dence for selective exposure have varied considerably, but recent work has provided evidence
of it specifically in relation to political information. Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009)
find evidence of selective exposure in a laboratory setting in which subjects could read op-
posing articles on four political issues (gun ownership, abortion, health care regulation, and
minimum wages), and Stroud (2008) uses survey data to argue for dual causality in media
consumption and political beliefs, consistent with selective exposure: individuals consume
media in accordance with their beliefs, and the media they consume impacts how their be-
liefs change over time.
The concepts of confirmation bias and selective exposure may seem somewhat identical at
this point, and there is certainly some overlap in the way they have been used in the litera-
ture. I introduce both terms because I want to make a distinction between a preference for
information that confirms one’s beliefs (confirmation bias) and a preference for information
sources that are more likely to provide such information (selective exposure). Given these
definitions, confirmation bias can be expected to lead to selective exposure, but selective
exposure does not necessarily imply the existence of confirmation bias.
To see why, note that if information sources differ in quality (the accuracy of their reports)
and a rational consumer cannot directly observe the quality of a source, they will form
beliefs about that quality based on how closely the reports match their prior beliefs. If
time or cognitive resources are limited, this could lead consumers to engage in selective
exposure, even though they would simply opt for the most accurate information if the quality
of information sources was known. The reputation model of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006)
demonstrates how this kind of setting could induce media bias.
The model I set out in this paper takes the accuracy and biases of the information structures
firms choose to offer as public knowledge. Given this I demonstrate how, when consumers
2The model of Rabin and Schrag (1999) provides an example of an alternative form of confirmation bias,
in which agents interpret the information they receive as more supportive of prior beliefs than it actually is.
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are affected by confirmation bias, they can prefer (and firms choose to offer) biased informa-
tion. The resulting location game between firms competing for consumers with heterogeneous
preferences is similar to the model of media markets in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005).
They also model consumers of information as motivated by confirmation bias, but they de-
fine preferences directly over reports, whereas I have drawn on recent work on psychological
information preferences (such as Lipnowski and Mathevet (2018)) to model confirmation bias
as a preference over future beliefs. In Mullainathan and Shleifer’s model, firms’ distortions
of information are linear, and reversible by a rational consumer. It is unclear what effect the
biased information would have on the beliefs of the consumers. In my model, consumers are
rational Bayesians who understand the information structures they are choosing between.
When they prefer a biased information structure, they gain a lower probability of being told
that they are wrong, but there is a tradeoff: the confirmatory reports are less convincing,
reducing their payoff. This paper shows how an acceptance of this tradeoff could lead con-
sumers to prefer biased information structures, in a framework that gives a full account of
their beliefs and could provide the basis for a model of how consumer beliefs and media biases
develop together over time.
Section 2 introduces the model of consumer preferences and the structure of the firms’
game. In Section 3 I consider consumers whose preferences over information sources are
purely determined by confirmation bias, derive their optimal signals and show how the firms’
game, which is two-dimensional, can be reduced to a one-dimensional location game. Section
4 extends the model to include an instrumental value of information, and demonstrates that
equivalent results to those in Section 3 still hold. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 The Basic Model
1.2.1 Psychological Preferences and Confirmation Bias
I model confirmation bias as a form of psychological preference, in which a consumer’s poste-
rior beliefs are a fundamental component of the utility she attaches to particular outcomes.
Various psychological phenomena can be modelled in this way, and Lipnowski and Mathevet
(2018) provide several examples. The appropriate form needed for such a beliefs-based utility
function to represent the phenomenon of confirmation bias merits some discussion.
Lipnowski and Mathevet’s examples include a formulation that seems aimed at confirmation
bias, or at least a related class of phenomena. They refer to it as ‘prior-bias’ or ‘stubbornness’,
and give the following utility function3:
U(a, ω, µ′;µ) = i(a, ω)− ρ |µ′ − µ|
Here ω is the state of the world, which can take on one of two values, µ is the prior belief
3For clarity, I use the same notation as the model I present later in the paper, rather than Lipnowski and
Mathevet’s original notation.
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of the agent expressed as the subjective probability she places on one of the two possible
states, µ′ is her posterior belief after receiving a message carrying some information, and a
is an action she takes having formed that posterior. Note that the measure on µ′ − µ is just
the absolute value, since the state is binary. The first term, i(a, ω), is dependent only on the
relationship between her action and the state. The second term, which is weighted by the
positive parameter ρ, is the psychological element of the agent’s utility: she incurs disutility
based on the absolute difference between her prior and posterior beliefs.
This is certainly something like confirmation bias; the second term represents a desire to
cling to one’s prior belief. However, there is no ‘confirmation’ for the agent to seek here.
Any information whatsoever will change her beliefs and incur psychological disutility. This
captures information-aversion, not confirmation bias. They differ because confirmation bias
is not an attachment on the agent’s part to the specific probabilities she attaches to each
possible state, but to the state she considers more likely ; that is, to her expected state.
To make this clearer, consider a more concrete example. Say the binary state reflects the
success or failure of some politically-charged policy; for example, whether a controversial
healthcare reform package has succeeded in reducing healthcare costs. If our hypotheti-
cal confirmation-biased consumer starts out as a supporter of the policy, attaching a high
probability (say 0.7) to its success, we do not expect her to be averse to information that
strengthens that belief; it is the belief that the policy has probably succeeded that she is
attached to, not the specific odds of 70%. The psychological utility should be maximised at
a posterior of 1, not 0.7.
The natural first step towards fixing this problem is to simply remove the absolute value
operator from the second term, and then determine that term’s sign based on whether the
prior µ is greater or less than 1
2
:
u(a, ω, µ′;µ) =
{
i(a, ω) + ρ(µ′ − µ) µ > 1
2
i(a, ω)− ρ(µ′ − µ) µ < 1
2
This captures confirmation-biased preferences over outcomes well enough; the psychological
payoff increases when the information received increases the agent’s confidence in the state
she originally held to be more likely, and decreases when it does the opposite. However, it
still leaves us with significant problems:
• An ambivalent agent who does not hold either state to be more likely (µ = 1
2
) should
not be influenced by confirmation bias, and payoffs should not be discontinuous at
µ = 1
2
, as it is rather implausible that moving from a very slight belief in favour of one
state to a very slight belief in the other direction would cause a dramatic reversal in
preferences.
• While the utility function does capture psychological preferences over outcomes, for
a Bayes-rational agent it does not affect preferences over information sources. An
information source (‘signal’) can be equated to a distribution over posterior beliefs
with expectation equal to the prior belief, as set out in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
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Since the psychological payoff above is linear in the posterior µ′ and symmetrical around
the prior µ, any information source will result in the same expected psychological payoff
(of 0).
A utility function that aims to plausibly represent confirmation bias in preferences over
information sources must address both of these issues. I formally present such a utility
function in the next subsection.
1.2.2 Consumer Payoffs
There is a binary state of the world, ω ∈ {A,B}. A consumer is born with some prior belief
about the state, expressed as P (A) = µ. On receiving information, she updates her beliefs
using Bayes’ rule and forms a posterior, P (A) = µ′. The utility U she receives from a given
outcome depends entirely on the true state ω, her prior belief µ, and her posterior belief µ′,
and is given by a function of the following form:
U(µ′, ω;µ) = i(µ′, ω) + ρu(µ′;µ)
Here i represents the instrumental value of information. It only depends on the posterior
and the true state. Typically it will be useful to think of this payoff as resulting from the
consumer’s choice of an optimal action given her beliefs, where the payoffs to possible actions
depend on the true state. The i function must be weakly increasing in the accuracy of the
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The second component of the utility function, u, represents the psychological preferences
associated with confirmation bias. It depends on the relationship between the prior µ and












2 µ′ < µ
Weighting by (µ− 1
2
) eliminates the problem at and around µ = 1
2
discussed in the previous
section. This function is continuous at µ = 1
2
, and the weighting captures the plausible
assumption that the degree of confirmation bias depends on the strength of the original prior,
approaching 0 as the prior approaches pure ambivalence at 1
2
. Since preferences reverse at
µ = 1
2
, in the sense that consumers with µ > 1
2
have a psychological payoff increasing in
the posterior where the psychological payoff of consumers with µ < 1
2
is decreasing in the
posterior, it is important to distinguish the two cases. I will refer to consumers with µ > 1
2
as A-biased consumers and to consumers with µ < 1
2
as B-biased consumers.
Giving the change in beliefs an exponent between 0 and 1 (I use 1
2
as a tractable example)
addresses the linearity problem, essentially making the consumer risk-averse with regard to
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her confirmation bias; she gets decreasing marginal utility from a greater degree of confirma-
tion. Essentially, the fact of (dis)confirmation is more important to her than the degree of it.
Figure 1.1 graphs the psychological payoff as a function of the posterior for a consumer with
a prior of 0.6; note how the marginal impact of an increased change in beliefs decreases as
she moves further from her prior. If the exponent on the change were instead greater than 1,
this would lead the consumer to engage in risk-seeking behavior; among signals with similar
overall accuracy, she would prefer those biased against her preferred state, because the lower
probability of confirmation would be compensated by a higher degree of certainty when it
did occur. It is not entirely implausible that such individuals exist, but it is not generally





Figure 1.1: Psychological payoffs to varying posterior beliefs, for µ = 0.6
1.2.3 Firms, Signals, and Timing
N firms face a unit mass of consumers who have heterogeneous prior beliefs, distributed
according to a commonly known cumulative distribution function F (µ). Firms offer signals
to consumers; each signal is an information structure which will generate a single message.
The message is drawn from the set {a, b}, with probabilities conditional on the state given
by α = P (a|A) and β = P (b|B). A firm’s choice of signal is the choice of values for these
two probabilities, subject to the labelling restriction α ≥ 1−β. This restriction ensures that
the message a is a report that the state is A, in the sense that it is more likely to be sent
in state A than in state B (and ensures the analogous relationship between message b and
state B). A signal that violates this restriction can be converted into one that satisfies it by
simply relabelling the two messages.
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Note that the firm’s decision amounts to choosing the accuracy of its reporting in each
possible state. The labelling restriction rules out consistent, across-all-states misreporting:
a firm cannot send message a whenever the state is B and message b whenever the state is
A, since this is informationally equivalent to just telling the truth. It does, however, allow
for biased reporting. A firm can offer a signal that is more accurate in one state than in the
other, all the way up to a signal that sends the same message every time (for example, α = 1,
β = 0, which always sends message a). I refer to signals as A-biased signals if they are
more accurate in state A (α > β) and B-biased signals if they are more accurate in state









Figure 1.2: The space of possible signals
Each firm aims to maximise its market share; that is, the proportion of consumers who choose
that firm’s signal. I am concerned here with a scenario in which advertising is their source
of revenue, and signals are free to consumers, as is typical of much modern digital media. I
denote the signal offered by a representative firm i by Si = (αi, βi). The set of all possible
signals is S̄, where:
S̄ = {(α, β) ∈ R2 : α, β ∈ [0, 1], α ≥ 1− β}
I allow mixed strategies, so a strategy for a firm is an element of ∆(S̄).
The timing of the game is as follows:
• Firms simultaneously announce their signals.
• Each consumer selects the signal that maximises her expected utility. If multiple signals
provide the highest available expected utility, the consumer selects from them randomly,
with equal probability.
• Each signal generates a message, which is sent to the consumers who have chosen that
signal. They update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule, potentially take an action based
on their updated beliefs, and receive utility according to the utility function given in
Section 2.2.
7
An equilibrium of this game is a strategy for each firm that maximises the firm’s expected
market share given the strategies of the other firms and the fact that consumers maximise
expected utility.
1.3 Pure Confirmation Bias
I begin by analysing the simplest possible case, in which i(µ′, ω) = c for some constant c, so
that the utility function is:
U(µ′, ω;µ) = c+ ρu(µ′;µ)
I will refer to preferences represented by the above utility function as pure confirmation
bias.
Pure confirmation bias implies that consumers get some fixed payoff from consuming a signal,
independent of its informativeness (perhaps some entertainment value derived from reading
the news), and otherwise only care about their psychological payoff. In general, it is not
particularly plausible that confirmation bias would be the only driver of a consumer’s choice of
information source, but addressing this case will help to clarify the effect of the psychological
preferences, and provide a baseline from which to extend to a more general case.
1.3.1 Consumer Preferences and Optimal Signals
The properties of a given signal (the values of α and β) enter into a consumer’s expected
psychological utility in two ways; they determine the probabilities she attaches to the two
possible outcomes, message a and message b, and they determine the posterior beliefs she
will update to (and consequently her psychological payoff) given either outcome. Denote the
probability a consumer with prior µ attaches to receiving a message m from a given signal S
by P (m|S, µ). These probabilities are given by:
P (a|S, µ) = 1− P (b|S, µ) = µα + (1− µ)(1− β) = µ(α + β − 1) + 1− β
Denote the posterior belief generated by receipt of a message m, given a signal S, as
µ′(m|S, µ). These posteriors are given by Bayes’ rule as:
µ′(a|S, µ) = µα
P (a|S, µ)
µ′(b|S, µ) = µ(1− α)
P (b|S, µ)
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Using these and taking expectations of the consumer’s utility function gives the expected
utility of a given signal:











Substituting in the expressions for the two possible posterior beliefs and factoring out common
terms gives the following:





















2 (1−µ) 12 is constant and does not vary with the properties
of the signal. Therefore, when the only consideration is confirmation bias, a consumer’s




(α + β − 1) 12 [P (a|S, µ) 12 − P (b|S, µ) 12 ] µ > 1
2
(α + β − 1) 12 [P (b|S, µ) 12 − P (a|S, µ) 12 ] µ < 1
2
0 µ = 1
2
Note that the first term in this expression, (α+ β − 1) 12 , is a measure of the informativeness
of the signal independent of the relative probabilities of the states, while the second term,
P (a|S, µ) 12 −P (b|S, µ) 12 for µ > 1
2
, represents the relative probability of good news compared
to bad news. The trade-off the consumer faces is laid out here, as increasing the second term
to its maximum value of 1 (a signal with α = 1 and β = 0, which always reports good news)
would reduce the first term to 0, since the signal would be entirely uninformative.
In discussing the resulting preferences over signals, I will often focus on the first case above,
A-biased consumers with µ > 1
2
. Because of the symmetry of the setup, analogous results
(substituting (1− µ) for µ and swapping α and β) hold for B-biased consumers.
Lemma 1. For µ > 1
2
, if α ≥ β, Vpure(S;µ) is increasing in α.
Proof. P (a|S, µ) is increasing in α (dP (a)
dα
= µ), so P (a|S, µ) 12 − P (b|S, µ) 12 is increasing in α.
Since α ≥ β and α ≥ 1− β, α ≥ 1
2
. Combining this with µ > 1
2
gives:
P (a|S, µ) = µα + (1− µ)(1− β) ≥ µα + (1− µ)(1− α) > 1
2
This implies that P (a|S, µ) 12 − P (b|S, µ) 12 > 0. Since Vpure(S;µ) is the product of two terms
that are both positive and increasing in α, it is increasing in α.
Lemma 1 shows that among A-biased signals, an A-biased consumer always prefers a signal
to generate more accurate reports in state A, for any given accuracy in state B.
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Lemma 2. For µ > 1
2
and signals Sx and Sy with αx + βx = αy + βy and αx > αy,
Vpure(Sx;µ) > Vpure(Sy;µ).
Proof. P (a|S, µ) is increasing in α and decreasing in β, and the reverse is true for P (b|S, µ).
Therefore (P (a|S, µ) 12 − P (b|S, µ) 12 ) is increasing in α and decreasing in β. Since αx > αy
and βx < βy, it follows that:
P (a|Sx, µ)
1
2 − P (b|Sx, µ)
1
2 > P (a|Sy, µ)
1
2 − P (b|Sy, µ)
1
2
As (αx + βx − 1)
1
2 = (αy + βy − 1)
1
2 , Vpure(Sx;µ) > Vpure(Sy, µ).
Lemma 2 implies that for a given ‘total accuracy’, an A-biased consumer would prefer that
as much of that accuracy as possible be assigned to state A.
Lemma 3. For an A-biased consumer with pure confirmation bias, any optimal signal has
α = 1.
Proof. Assume an optimal signal Sx exists with αx < 1. Construct a new signal Sy with
αy = 1, βy = βx + αx − 1. By Lemma 2, this new signal is preferred to the original signal,
which therefore cannot be optimal.
This result is intuitive, since we would expect a biased consumer to prefer accuracy in the
event that her biases turn out to be correct. To return to the healthcare-policy example I
introduced in Section 1.2.1, let us say that state A represents the success of the policy, and
state B the failure of the policy. If a consumer suffers from confirmation bias and has a prior
belief that the policy is likely to succeed, then if the policy does succeed, she would prefer
her ideal news source to report the fact accurately. However, since the consumer is Bayesian,
accuracy in the preferred state does come at a cost. The fact that the optimal signal has
α = 1 implies that any b report from such a signal produces certainty that the state is B;
the worst possible outcome. This provides an incentive to seek a reduced probability of such
reports (a lower β), which must be weighed against the fact that this will make a reports
less convincing, and therefore less rewarding.
Lemma 4. For µ > 1
2
, Vpure((1, β);µ) is strictly concave in β.
For a proof, see the appendix.
Lemmas 3 and 4 together imply that each A-biased consumer has a unique optimal signal,
of the form (1, β∗).
Proposition 1. For an A-biased consumer with pure confirmation bias, the unique optimal









For a proof, see the appendix.
Corollary 1. For a B-biased consumer with pure confirmation bias, the unique optimal signal









Proposition 1 demonstrates that a consumer’s optimal signal can involve a degree of inac-









). If a consumer believes that the healthcare policy is likely to succeed,
but lacks confidence in that belief, the worry that an accurate source will inform her that
she was wrong may drive her to prefer a source that will sometimes report success even in
the event of failure; but, crucially, not always, since in that case she could not derive any
confirmation of her beliefs from the entirely predictable report of success.
It may seem counter-intuitive that the degree of bias that the consumer desires, as measured
by 1 − β∗bias(µ), increases as the prior approaches 12 . After all, my reason for weighting the
psychological utility by µ− 1
2
was to capture the idea that consumers with more ambivalent
priors should suffer less from confirmation bias. This shows the limitations of the pure
confirmation bias case. The consumers who are most confident in their priors would choose
a perfectly accurate signal, because they believe an accurate signal has a high probability
of reporting their preferred state, and they gain a larger increase in their belief in that case
than they would with a biased signal. Less confident but still confirmation-biased consumers
face a higher subjective risk of an unpleasant report, so they are willing to trade off a portion
of the payoff from a pleasant report to reduce this risk. The fact that their confirmation-bias
payoffs are smaller than those of the more confident consumers does not affect the outcome,
since in this case there is no instrumental value to be derived from a more accurate signal.
Concavification
An alternative view of the optimal signals derived above comes from the concavification ap-
proach of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). They are concerned with the optimal information
structure for a principal whose payoff varies with the posterior belief of an agent; here it
is the agent’s payoff that varies with the posterior, but the framework is the same. The
best payoff she can attain can be found by constructing the concave envelope of her utility
function (the smallest concave function that is everywhere larger than the original function)
and evaluating it at her prior, since, for a Bayesian agent, a signal induces a distribution over
posterior beliefs with expectation equal to the prior belief. Figure 1.3 shows how this applies
in the current case, using the payoffs for µ = 0.6 as in Figure 1.1 and showing the concave
envelope. The optimal signal S∗ allows the consumer to mix between a posterior of 0 and
a posterior of µ′(a|S∗). The expected payoff of the optimal signal, E(U |S∗) is given by the
value of the concave envelope evaluated at the prior of 0.64.
4The concavification argument demonstrates that the consumer-optimal signal I have derived is optimal









Figure 1.3: Concave envelope and optimal signal payoff for µ = 0.6
1.3.2 The Distribution of Preferences
In order to understand the firms’ problem, it is useful to consider how the distribution of
priors (values of µ) in the consumer population determines the distribution of preferences
over signals. We have seen that consumer-optimal signals must have either α = 1, β = 1, or
both. This means that despite the two-dimensional nature of signals, the set of consumer-
optimal signals is one dimensional (it is the outer boundary of the triangle in Figure 2) and
can be mapped onto an interval. Taking this to be [0, 1], a signal (α, 1) or (1, β) maps to a





α ≤ 1, β = 1
1− β
2
α = 1, β ≤ 1
Figure 1.4 shows how signals (labelled above the line) map to points on the interval (labelled
below the line). The perfectly accurate signal (with α and β both equal to 1) is located at
the centre of the interval, with A-biased signals to the right and B-biased signals to the left.
Signals become more biased on moving further from the centre point (decreasing α by moving
left from the centre, decreasing β by moving right from the centre); the endpoints equate to












Figure 1.4: Signals mapped onto the [0, 1] interval.




, 1] 7→ [0, 1], which maps from a confirmation-biased



























Assume that the distribution of consumer priors F (µ) is continuous at 1
2
. This is a fairly
harmless assumption, since any mass of consumers in the population at µ = 1
2
will, in the pure
confirmation-bias case, have no preference ordering over signals and can be assumed to choose
randomly; the relevant population are consumers with confirmation bias, and nothing is lost
here by treating F (µ) as the distribution of their priors. Given this, it is straightforward to












































I have defined these mappings on [0, 1] for clarity, but the relevant interval is really the subset
of [0, 1] on which consumers are actually found; that is:
L = [min suppG,max suppG]














Define Ls as the set of signals that map into L. That is, any signal S such that l(S) exists
and l(S) ∈ L.
Arranging consumers on an interval in this way may seem a little abstract, but it will help
clarify both consumers’ preferences over signals and the character of the firms’ problem. The
13
key intuition is that since consumers’ preferred signals all fall within Ls, so should firms’
equilibrium offerings. The only reason for firms to offer other signals (which would not be
optimal for any consumer) would be to strike a balance between the preferences of consumers
with differing priors. I next show that signals outside of Ls cannot do this any better than
signals in Ls.
Lemma 5. With pure confirmation bias, for any signal S /∈ Ls, there exists a signal S0(S) ∈
Ls such that S0(S) is strictly preferred to S by every consumer with µ 6= 12 .
See the appendix for a proof. It is obviously the case that a given consumer will prefer some
signal in Ls to a signal outside of that set, since Ls will contain her optimal signal, but this
result is stronger: each signal outside of Ls is dominated by a fixed signal inside the set that
is preferred by all consumers. This is an important result, because it implies that firms can
never do better by offering signals not in Ls, and I can focus on equilibria in which all firms
offer signals that map into L.
Note that Lemma 5 does not quite rule out equilibria in which firms offer such signals. For
an arbitrary pair of signals, it is not guaranteed that a consumer indifferent between the
two signals exists; even if the initial distribution of priors has full support on [0, 1], it is
possible for all A-biased consumers to strictly prefer one signal and all B-biased consumers
the other. It follows that a firm could potentially offer a signal not in Ls without standing to
gain customers by offering the universally-preferred signal implied by Lemma 5. Such a firm
would be vulnerable to complete capture of its customer base by another firm, but if there
are more than two firms, this would not necessarily be profitable for any other firm.
Such potential equilibria are of little interest. For any such equilibrium, there is a correspond-
ing equilibrium in which every firm offers a signal in Ls; simply replace the signals in their
original strategies with the universally-preferred signals. Further, it does not make intuitive
sense for firms to offer signals outside of Ls. For a firm to do so is to leave itself needlessly
unprotected against unexpected moves by its opponents; simply put, there is no reason why
a firm should ever offer a signal if another signal exists that is preferred by every consumer.
To capture this intuition, I apply the ’trembling-hand-perfection’ equilibrium refinement of
Selten (1974).
Proposition 2. With pure confirmation bias, any equilibrium in which any firm offers a
signal not in Ls with positive probability is not trembling-hand-perfect.
Proof. Consider a signal S /∈ Ls. By Lemma 5, the strategy of offering S is weakly dominated
by the strategy of offering S0(S): it never yields a lower market share, and yields a strictly
higher market share if every other firm offers S. Therefore offering S cannot be an equilibrium
strategy in any perturbed game, since dominance is strict when every other firm plays every
signal (S and S0(S) in particular) with positive probability. Therefore the pure strategy of
offering S cannot be part of a trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium.
The proof for mixed strategies is analogous: a strategy that puts a positive probability weight
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on signals outside of Ls is weakly dominated by a strategy that shifts that weight onto the
universally-preferred signals in Ls.
Having restricted attention to a one-dimensional space, my next result gives the role that
distance plays within that space; a given consumer prefers the closest of all the signals located
to her left, and the closest of all the signals located to her right.
Proposition 3. With pure confirmation bias, if there exist two signals, Sx, Sy ∈ Ls, and
there exists a consumer located at a point l∗, such that either l∗ ≥ l(Sx) > l(Sy) or l∗ ≤
l(Sx) < l(Sy), that consumer prefers Sx to Sy.
See the appendix for a proof. Note that the spatial analogy here is imperfect, as distance
only directly corresponds to the preference ordering among the signals in one direction: a
consumer may prefer a signal to her left to one on her right (or vice versa) despite the
preferred signal being ‘further away’ than the other.
Since there is a one-to-one mapping between signals in Ls and locations in the closed interval
L, restricting attention to strategies in which firms only offer signals in Ls and applying
Proposition 3 converts the analysis of the firms’ problem into a one-dimensional location
game, similar to the classic ‘Main Street’ location game of Hotelling (1929) or the model of
news markets in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005).
1.3.3 Duopoly
When there are two firms, the trembling-hand-perfection refinement of Proposition 2 is not
necessary; offering a signal outside Ls always provides the other firm with an opportunity
to capture the entire market. Any signals offered in equilibrium must be in Ls. In fact, if
there are no ‘gaps’ in the distribution of consumer priors (if F is strictly increasing), there
is a unique equilibrium, as the next proposition demonstrates.
Proposition 4. If F is strictly increasing, then there is a unique equilibrium in which both
firms offer the signal corresponding to the median of G, the distribution of consumer prefer-
ences on L.
Proof. Denote the two firms by x and y. If both firms offer the same signal, Sx = Sy, their
expected market share is 1
2
. This implies that in any pure-strategy equilibrium, the expected
market share of each firm must be 1
2
. If it was not, the firm receiving less than 1
2
could do
better by simply offering the same signal as the other firm.
If Sx /∈ Ls, firm y can offer S0(Sx) and gain the entire market (by Lemma 5). Therefore
signals outside of Ls cannot be offered in equilibrium and attention can be restricted without
loss to signals with a location in L.
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The situation is analogous to a standard two-firm Hotelling game without prices. Since F
is strictly increasing, G is strictly increasing and has a unique median. Denote it by Gmed.
Assume that an equilibrium exists in which both firms receive an expected market share of
1
2








. In the former case, firm y
can gain a market share greater than 1
2
by deviating to l(Sx) + ε for some sufficiently small
ε; by locating just to the right of firm x, they can gain a fraction, arbitrarily close to 1, of





. Therefore the firm can gain a market share greater than 1
2
. The same
applies in the other case, using a deviation just to the left of firm x (to l(Sx)− ε). Therefore
this cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, assume both firms offer signals located at Gmed. Both firms have an expected market
share of 1
2
, and clearly neither firm has any deviation that can increase their market share:
any location to the left of Gmed provides no access to the half of consumers with optimal
signals to the right of Gmed, and similarly signals to the right cannot gain consumers to the
left. Therefore this is an equilibrium.
The assumption that F is strictly increasing is actually stronger than is necessary here; it
guarantees that G has a unique median, which guarantees a unique equilibrium. Even if G
does not have a unique median5, an analogous argument shows that a pair of strategies form
an equilibrium if and only if there are no non-median points in their supports.
This result illustrates why mapping consumers onto an interval effectively characterises the
strategic situation for firms. When a firm offers a signal, say an A-biased one, it divides
consumers into two groups6: those A-biased consumers who would prefer that the signal
be at least marginally more A-biased (consumers to the right of the firm’s location), and
consumers who would prefer the signal be at least marginally less A-biased (consumers to
the left of the firm’s location, including all B-biased consumers). A different firm offering an
alternative signal can take an arbitrarily large fraction of one of these groups of consumers,
by positioning marginally to the left or marginally to the right of the original firm, but cannot
gain access to both groups7.
Note that for a distribution of priors that is symmetric around µ = 1
2
, this leads both firms
to offer a perfectly accurate signal. However, if the distribution is asymmetric or centred
around another point, the firms may offer a biased signal. Further, the median of the pref-
5A median here is any point l ∈ L with G(l) = 12 . A simple example of multiple medians is given by a
discrete distribution with half of the consumers located at a point l1 and half at a point l2 > l1. In this case
any point l that satisfies l1 ≤ l ≤ l2 is a median.
6This is only strictly true if the signal is not located at a mass point of G. Otherwise there is a third
group of consumers who prefer that signal to any alternative.
7The result notably differs from that of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), in which duopolistic firms offer
extreme bias in order to differentiate themselves. This difference results from my focus on market share
maximisation and advertising revenue, where Mullainathan and Shleifer’s model has firms setting prices for
their signals. This difference is the norm for one-dimensional location games with and without prices, and
does not result from the differing formulations of consumer preferences.
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erence distribution G(l) does not generally correspond to the optimal signal of a consumer
at the median of the distribution of priors, F (µ). In fact, they only correspond when the
median of G(l) is at l = 1
2
, the perfectly accurate signal. This is due to the fact that con-
sumers at opposite ends of the distribution of priors (µ close to 0 or 1) can be close together
in the preference distribution, and similarly, consumers who are close together in the prior
distribution but on opposite sides of 1
2
can be at opposite ends of the preference distributions.
Consumers who have very different initial beliefs can have similar preferences over signals,
because the combination of confirmation bias and confidence generates a preference for ac-
curacy; consumers who are very confident that the state is A and consumers who are very
confident that the state is B will both prefer an accurate signal, although they will expect
different results from it.
1.3.4 More Than Two Firms
Duopoly is not typical of modern media markets. In the age of online media, a vast array of
information providers are readily accessible. As described in the introduction to this paper,
there is good reason to believe these providers offer varying biases. The natural question is
whether this model reflects that differentiation when extended to more firms; is the clustering
around the median of the preference distribution an artifact of the restriction to duopoly?
To answer this question in the affirmative, I begin by constructing an example equilibrium
with three firms and a simple, discrete consumer distribution, in which the firms offer non-
median signals with positive probability.
Example Three-Firm Equilibrium
Consumer Distribution
All consumers are one of three types, θ1, θ2, and θ3. Each type θ has an optimal signal
located in L at a point l∗(θ), and l∗(θ1) < l
∗(θ2) < l
∗(θ3). That is, θ1 is the most A-biased
type, θ3 the most B-biased, and θ2 falls in the middle. Further, θ2 consumers have a prior
that leaves them precisely indifferent between l∗(θ1) and l
∗(θ3); if offered these two signals,
they randomize evenly between them.
The distribution of types is as follows:
P (θ) =
{
p θ = θ2
1−p
2
θ = θ1, θ3
So this setting is doubly symmetric: the ‘centrist’ type is indifferent between the preferred




When three firms face the consumer distribution described above, there is a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium in which the firms offer all three types of signal, as long as the number
of ‘centrist’ consumers is smaller than the number of either of the ‘extreme’ types; that is,
as long as p < 1
3
.
To see this, assume that two firms play a strategy in which they offer a signal at l∗(θ2) with




. Let Γ(l) denote the expected
market share for a firm when it offers a signal at l. Then the third firm’s expected market
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Any other location is weakly dominated by the consumer-optimal locations given that each
of the other firms will locate at one of them, so equating these expressions and solving for
q yields a symmetric-equilibrium strategy as long as a solution exists that falls between 0
and 1. Such a solution exists if and only if p < 1
3
, in which case the symmetric equilibrium








l = l∗(θ1), l
∗(θ3)
0 otherwise
There is still an element of clustering here; if other firms stick to ‘extreme’ positions, the
‘centre’ becomes attractive as a firm can capture a large audience in the event that both
other firms take the same ‘extreme’ position. Once there are enough centrists, p ≥ 1
3
, this
effect dominates and all firms offering l∗(θ2) becomes the only equilibrium.
General Results
In general, specific equilibria are challenging to derive when there are more than two firms
(and pure-strategy equilibria typically do not exist). However, where mixed-strategy equilib-
ria exist, the following two propositions, which adapt results for more conventional location
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games derived in Osborne and Pitchik (1986), demonstrate that as the number of firms rises,
they will offer a wider variety of reporting biases catering to more ’extreme’ consumers.
Proposition 5. Given a consumer preference distribution G, for any l ∈ suppG and any
ε > 0, there exists an M such that for any N > M , if there exists an equilibrium for N firms
in which firm i’s strategy is given by Hi, then for at least one i, suppHi ∩ [l − ε, l + ε] 6= ∅.
This proposition simply captures the intuitive conclusion that if there is a region (a range
of biases) in which some positive number of consumers’ optimal signal is located, then once
there are sufficient firms in the market, it cannot be optimal for all firms to ignore that
region. This follows straightforwardly from the continuity of consumer preferences in their
prior; since consumers at l strictly prefer a signal at l to any other signal, and in particular
any signal outside [l − ε, l + ε], there is some interval around l in which consumers prefer a
signal at l to any signal outside [l− ε, l+ ε]. Since l ∈ suppG, there are a positive number of
such consumers, who can be captured with certainty by locating at l if no firm ever locates
in [l − ε, l + ε]. For a large enough number of firms this number must be above the lower
bound on equilibrium payoffs8.
Note that for any interval that shares an endpoint with the support of G (a region of signals
that stretches to the most ‘extreme’ biases in the consumer population), it is straightforward
to give an upper bound on the number of firms for which it is possible for that interval to be
neglected in equilibrium. Denote min suppG by gmin, and consider an arbitrary location l,
with G(l) > 0. Then if the number of firms n is large enough that G(l) > 1
2n−1 , firms must
locate in the interval [gmin, l] with positive probability in any equilibrium.
I next adapt a key result of Osborne and Pitchik (1986) to the present setting. They prove
that in one-dimensional location games with linear transportation costs, if symmetric mixed
strategy equilibria converge as the number of firms rises, they must converge to the distribu-
tion of consumers.
Proposition 6. If the distribution of priors F is continuous and there exists a subsequence
{nk} of N such that for each k, there exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which




and a twice continuously differentiable (other than at 1
2
) mixed strategy H exists such that
Hk → H, H ′k → H ′, and H ′′k → H ′′ uniformly, then H = G.
See the appendix for a proof.
Propositions 5 and 6 suggest that as the number of firms grows, competition will drive firms
to ‘go where the consumers are’ and offer a wider variety of biases.
8In any equilibrium, a firm always has a deviation to a strategy followed by some other firm, which in the
worst case yields a payoff equal to half the other firm’s equilibrium payoff. Combining this with the fact that
payoffs must sum to one yields the condition that in an n-firm equilibrium, no firm can have an expected
payoff lower than 12n−1 .
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1.4 Partially-biased Preferences
I now turn to the more plausible case in which accurate information does have an instrumental
value. Assume that each consumer, having consumed a signal and updated their beliefs, must






Figure 1.5: State-matching Action Payoffs
Here the consumer is trying to correctly match her action to the state. In the healthcare-
policy example, one could imagine that the consumer can change healthcare plan and that
doing so will be beneficial if the policy is successful, or harmful if it is a failure.
Given that the consumer will choose her action to maximise her payoff given her posterior





1 µ′ ≥ 1
2
, ω = A
1 µ′ < 1
2
, ω = B
0 otherwise
The full utility function in this case is:
U(µ′, ω;µ) = imatch(µ
′, ω) + ρu(µ′;µ)
I will refer to preferences represented by this utility function as partially-biased prefer-
ences.
1.4.1 Consumer Preferences
Consider an A-biased consumer. Since µ′ depends on the signal she consumes, the (ex ante)
expected instrumental value given a signal S = (α, β) is a function of α and β:
E(imatch|α, β) =
{
αµ+ β(1− µ) µ′(b|α, β) < 1
2
µ µ′(b|α, β) ≥ 1
2
9I assume for simplicity that at µ′ = 12 the consumer chooses z1.
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An A-biased consumer’s default action, based on her prior, is z1. Only a b report can change
her action (an a report simply strengthens her confidence in her default action), and it only
does so if it is sufficiently convincing (µ′(b|α, β) < 1
2
)10. All signals with insufficiently con-
vincing b reports are equivalent in instrumental value; they vary in their effect on beliefs, but
not on the resulting action. Note that despite its piecewise definition, the expected instru-
mental value is still continuous: substituting for µ′(b|α, β) using Bayes’ rule at µ′(b|α, β) = 1
2
gives αµ+ β(1− µ) = µ, and µ′ is continuous in α and β.
Substituting back into the full utility function gives the consumer’s complete expected payoff
as a function of the properties of the signal:





Similar results apply as in the case of pure confirmation bias. I focus once again on A-biased
consumers.
Lemma 6. For an A-biased consumer with partially-biased preferences, any optimal signal
has α = 1.
Proof. Any signal that maximises Vpure(S;µ) has α = 1, by Lemma 3. This is also true of




2 (1− µ) 12Vpure(S;µ), since ρ(µ− 12)µ
1
2 (1− µ) 12 does not
vary with the signal and is positive. E(imatch|α, β) is weakly increasing in α. Therefore, any
signal that maximises E(imatch|α, β) + ρ(µ− 12)µ
1
2 (1− µ) 12Vpure(S;µ) must have α = 1.






2 (1− µ) 12Vpure((1, β);µ) is strictly concave in β by Lemma 4. With α = 1,
µ′(b) = 0, which gives E(imatch|1, β) = µ + β(1 − µ), which is a linear in β. Therefore
E(U |(1, β)) is strictly concave as it is the sum of a strictly concave function and a linear
function.
Of course, these properties are familiar from Section 1.3.1, and the optimisation problem is
quite similar to the pure case, as the following result makes clear.
Proposition 7. For an A-biased consumer with partially-biased preferences, the unique
consumer-optimal signal is (1, β∗match), where β
∗



















Corollary 2. For an A-biased consumer with partially-biased preferences, β̂(µ; ρ) is decreas-
ing in ρ, and β∗match approaches β
∗
bias as ρ goes to infinity.
10Recall that µ′(b|α, β) is the posterior belief following a b report from a signal S = (α, β)
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See the appendix for a proof.
The implication of this is that, intuitively enough, as confirmation bias assumes more im-
portance relative to the instrumental payoff, the incentive to opt for a biased signal grows,
and if ρ is sufficiently large, some set of A-biased consumers will have an optimal signal with
β < 1.
However, the relationship between priors and signal preferences is somewhat different than
in the pure case. This is because the (µ − 1
2
) weighting on the psychological payoff, irrele-
vant in the pure case, matters here - it impacts the balance between the instrumental and
psychological payoffs. Figure 1.6 graphs β̂(µ; ρ) for various fixed values of ρ, showing how




β̂(µ; ρ) = 2 for any ρ. This implies that for any arbitrarily large ρ, a sufficiently am-
bivalent consumer with µ close enough to 1
2
will prefer a perfectly accurate signal. So will a
sufficiently confident consumer with µ close enough to 1 or 0.
With the instrumental value of information present, the counter-intuitive result of the pure
case, in which nearly-ambivalent consumers were the most biased, disappears. It is consumers
‘in the middle’ who may prefer a biased signal, with prior beliefs strong enough that they
are psychologically invested in them and have significant confirmation bias, but not so strong
that they would trust in a perfectly accurate information source to give them the news they
want to hear.













Figure 1.6: β̂(µ; ρ) for various ρ
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1.4.2 Firms
The situation faced by firms is qualitatively the same as in the case of pure confirmation bias.
The translation from the distribution F (µ) of priors to the distribution G(l) of consumers
on the interval L is more complex, and consumers with different priors can have the same
optimal signal (as is clear from Figure 1.6) and therefore be located at the same point on
L. Nonetheless, the different distribution of consumers is essentially the only difference as
regards the firms’ problem, as the following results demonstrate.
Proposition 8. With partially-biased preferences, if there exist two signals, Sx, Sy ∈ Ls and
a consumer located at a point l∗, such that either l∗ ≥ l(Sx) > l(Sy) or l∗ ≤ l(Sx) < l(Sy),
that consumer prefers Sx to Sy.
Proof. Assume a B-biased consumer, without loss of generality. For signals with the same
direction of bias as l∗, of the form (α, 1), the result follows from the optimality of l∗ and the
concavity of E(U |(α, 1)). For signals on the other half of L, of the form (1, β), note that
wherever Vpure(S;µ) is increasing in α or β so is E(U |(α, β)), since E(imatch|α, β) is weakly
increasing in both variables. The proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix demonstrates that
Vpure(S;µ) is increasing in β (decreasing in distance from the perfectly-accurate centre point)
along the other half of L, so the same is true of E(U |(α, β)).
Proposition 9. With partially-biased preferences, applying the ‘trembling-hand-perfect’ equi-
librium refinement of Selten (1974) removes any equilibria in which firms offer ‘off-the-line’
signals with positive probability.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that Lemma 5 holds under partially-biased preferences. The
proof of Lemma 5 shows that that for any signal Sx = (αx, βx), Sx /∈ Ls, there is a signal
(α0, 1) such that α0 > αx and Vpure((α0, 1);µ) > Vpure(Sx;µ) for all µ 6= 12 . Since α0 > αx,
1 ≥ βx, and E(imatch|α, β) is weakly increasing in α and β, E(imatch|α0, 1) ≥ E(imatch|αx, βx).
Therefore (α0, 1) is still universally preferred to (αx, βx) given partially-biased preferences and
Lemma 5 still applies.
These results demonstrate that adding the instrumental value of information does not fun-
damentally alter the nature of the firms’ problem, which can still be characterised as a
one-dimensional location game. In fact, the proofs of Propositions 4, 5 and 6 apply without
alteration. However, it should stressed that while the game that results from the distribution
of consumer preferences has the same structure in both the pure bias and partial bias cases,
the results may be different, because the preference distribution itself will be different. In the
pure case, a demand for more heavily biased signals would be driven by an initially uncertain
population, but in the more plausible case of partial bias, consumers with somewhat stronger
prior convictions would be the source of any demand for bias, as long as their beliefs are not
so strong that they do not fear disconfirmation.
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1.5 Conclusion
The model developed in this paper demonstrates how confirmation bias, expressed as pref-
erences over future beliefs, admits a plausible formulation that leads to preferences over
information structures consistent with the phenomenon of selective exposure. Unless they
start out with sufficiently confident prior beliefs, consumers with preferences purely deter-
mined by confirmation bias prefer a biased information source to a perfectly accurate one.
The bias can only ever be partial, since the source must sometimes report bad news in order
to give the good news credibility, and the impact of good news on beliefs is weakened by the
consumers’ awareness of the bias. Nonetheless, this is a tradeoff a consumer may be willing
to accept when the fact of confirmation matters more than the degree of it. Even when a
competing preference for accurate information is present, as in Section 1.4, some group of
consumers prefer biased signals as long as the weight placed on confirmation bias is large
enough.
The relative weighting of confirmation bias11 versus a preference for accuracy should not be
thought of as fixed across all contexts, but as potentially varying depending on the subject
matter that the state space represents, consistent with the mixed empirical results on the
existence of selective exposure over different kinds of information. If confirmation bias has
a larger impact when the information concerns political issues than when it concerns, say,
entertainment news, this can be expressed in the model by a lower weight on confirmation
bias.
The industrial setting that results from my formulation of consumer preferences, with het-
erogeneous priors leading to heterogeneous preferences that can be expressed spatially on an
interval, is similar to Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005). The differing results for duopoly (in
their model, the firms offer extreme bias in order to differentiate) should not be overempha-
sised, since their model includes prices where mine does not; the inclusion of prices leading
to differentiation when firms would not differentiate without prices is a classic feature of
Hotelling-style location models. The distinction between their model and the model of this
paper lies in my account of consumers’ beliefs and the relationship between those beliefs and
their preferences, which provides clarity on just what kind of biased information they prefer,
and how we should expect it to impact their beliefs. This could provide a basis on which to
build an account of how beliefs and biased reporting develop together over time; one potential
extension of this model is to introduce dynamics, and to consider under what circumstances
differences in initial beliefs across consumers might be expected to converge or not.
In reality, there are a number of plausible explanations for the variation in reporting described
in the introduction to this paper, and it is likely that a range of factors have some degree
of influence. The results in this paper demonstrate that it is possible to give an account of
confirmation bias as a potential cause of differing consumer tastes for reporting ‘slants’ that
results in a familiar kind of product-differentiation problem for firms, without needing to
admit any irrationality in how consumers process information and update their beliefs.
11Represented in the model by the parameter ρ.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
For µ > 1
2
:
Vpure((1, β);µ) = (β − (1− µ)β2)
1



















(β − (1− µ)β2)
< 0
Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 3 implies that the consumer-optimal signal can be found by maximising the following
function with respect to β:
Vpure((1, β)) = (β − β2(1− µ))
1
2 − β(1− µ)
1
2
Since this function is concave by Lemma 4, it has a unique maximum either at the boundary of
its domain (which is [0, 1] since β is a probability) or when the following first-order condition
is satisfied.
1− 2β(1− µ)




That this condition is satisfied by 2−
√
2









, in which case the
consumer-optimal signal is the perfectly-accurate signal with β = 1 by the concavity of
Vpure((1, β)).
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a B-biased consumer with l∗ located on the left half of the interval. By the op-
timality of l∗ and the concavity of Vpure((α, 1);µ), moving in either direction along the in-







) or to the perfectly-accurate centre point (l = 1
2
). This establishes the result for
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ly < l
∗. For ly > l
∗ we must also consider the other half of the interval - signals of the form
(1, β). Note that for µ < 1
2
:














β − (1− µ)β2
) 1








Therefore, it is a convex function that is minimised at 2−
√
2










is, the value of β that minimises Vpure((1, β);µ) is lower than the value of β corresponding
to any point on the right half of the interval (the minimum is ’beyond’ the endpoint of the
interval), so Vpure((1, β);µ) is increasing in β at any such point. This means that the value
of ly decreases as it moves rightwards along the interval away from the perfectly accurate
centre point. This establishes the result for ly > l
∗.
The proof for A-biased consumers is analogous.
Proof of Lemma 5
Consider a signal Sx = (αx, βx), Sx /∈ Ls. Assume without loss of generality that αx ≤ βx
(noting that in combination with the labelling restriction β > 1−α, this implies that β ≥ 1
2
).
I will be concerned with the following function:














(α + 1− β)
1







(α2 − (1− β)2)
1




I will show that there exists a value α0 with αx < α0 ≤ 1, such that V0(α, β) = V0(α0, 1),
and that the signal (α0, 1) is preferred to (αx, βx) by all consumers.
Lemma A.1. For α ≤ β, ∂V0
∂β
< 0, except at α = β = 1
2
.
Proof. For α < β,
(
(α + 1 − β) 12 − (β + 1 − α) 12
)
is negative. It is also decreasing in β.
Since V0(α, β) is the product of a term that is positive and increasing in β and a term that
is negative and decreasing in β, it is decreasing in β.
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(β2 − (1− β)2) 12
− β
(β2 − (1− β)2) 12
< 0
This partial derivative is not defined at α = β = 1
2
, but the limit as α and β approach 1
2
is 0.
Lemma A.2. For any signal Sx = (αx, βx) with αx ≤ βx that is not in Ls, there exists a
unique α0 > αx such that V0(α0, 1) = V0(αx, βx) and α0 > 1− 1√2 .
Proof. Assume that βx < 1. By Lemma A.1:
V0(αx, 1) < V0(αx, βx)
Since αx ≤ βx, V0(αx, βx) ≤ 0. The function V0(α, 1) = 1√2(α − (2α − α
2)
1
2 ) is convex and
continuous in α for 0 ≤ α ≤ 2, and V0(1, 1) = 0. We have:
V0(αx, 1) < V0(αx, βx) ≤ V0(1, 1)
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a value α0 in the interval (αx, 1] such that
V0(α0, 1) = V0(αx, βx). This value is unique by the convexity of V0(α, 1).
Now assume that βx = 1. Since Sx /∈ Ls, this implies that αx < 1 − 1√2 . The convex
function V0(α, 1) has its minimum at α = 1 − 1√2 . Since V0(αx, 1) ≤ 0 and V0(1, 1) = 0, the
intermediate value theorem again ensures that an appropriate α0 exists.
Lemma A.3. For µ > 1
2







always positive. For µ < 1
2
, they are always negative.
Proof. I use the expressions P (a) and P (b) for the probabilities of the possible reports in the
algebra of this proof, for readability. To follow their use, note the following equalities:
P (a) = µ(α + β − 1) + 1− β
P (b) = 1− P (a) = (1− µ)(α + β − 1) + 1− α
∂P (a)
∂µ








The main proof is as follows. For µ > 1
2
:

































(α + β − 1) 12P (a) 12 − 1
2





(α + β − 1) 12P (b) 12 + 1
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Therefore the cross partial derivatives in this case are given by the negatives of the expressions
derived above, and are negative.
Lemma A.4. The signal (α0, 1) is strictly preferred to (αx, βx) by every consumer with µ 6= 12 .
Proof. The difference in the value of the two signals is given by:
Vpure((α0, 1);µ)− Vpure((αx, βx);µ) =Vpure((α0, 1);µ)− Vpure((αx, 1);µ)
+ Vpure((αx, 1);µ)− Vpure((αx, βx);µ)
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((αx, 1);µ) ≥ ∂V∂µ ((αx, βx);µ); so the derivative above is positive. For
µ < 1
2
, the inequalities are reversed, and the derivative is negative.
We have, therefore, that Vpure((α0, 1);µ)− Vpure((αx, βx);µ) is increasing in µ for µ > 12 and
decreasing in µ for µ < 1
2
















V0((α0, 1);µ)− V0((αx, βx);µ)
)
= 0
Therefore, Vpure((α0, 1);µ) > Vpure((αx, βx) for any µ 6= 12 .
Proof of Corollary 2




















































































To prove that β∗match approaches β
∗





































































Proof of Proposition 6
Let S(l) be the unique signal located at l and let V (l, µ) be an expression giving the value of
that signal to a consumer with prior µ ∈ (0, 1). Specificially, with purely confirmation biased
preferences, as in Section 1.3:
V (l, µ) = Vpure(S(l);µ)
In the case of state-matching preferences, as in Section 1.4:
V (l, µ) = E(U |S, µ)
In order to specify a firm’s expected payoff when locating at a given point, I introduce a
function, C(l, l′) : L2 → [0, 1], which when l 6= l′ gives the probability that a consumer
prefers the left-most of the two signals, l and l′. At l = l′ it gives the probability that
l∗(µ) ≤ l; that is, G(l).
The methods I use to prove Proposition 6 require that for a fixed l̄ 6= 0.5, C(l̄, l′) is continuous
and differentiable in l′ except at a finite number of points. The various lemmas that follow
contribute to a proof of this, culminating in Lemmas A.19 and A.20. Note that I use ] [ as
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the notation for open endpoints of an interval in this section, to avoid confusion with ordered
pairs.
I begin by defining C(l, l′):
C(l, l′) =

P (V (l′, µ) ≥ V (l, µ)) l′ < l
G(l) l′ = l
P (V (l, µ) ≥ V (l′, µ)) l′ > l
Lemma A.5. For any l̄ ∈ L \ {0.5}, C(l̄, l′) is continuous at l′ = l̄.
Proof. I first show that lim
l′↓l̄
C(l̄, l′) = G(l̄):
lim
l′↓l̄
C(l̄, l′) = lim
l′↓l̄




P (V (l̄, µ) ≥ V (l′, µ)|l∗(µ) ≤ l̄)P (l∗(µ) ≤ l̄)





P (l∗(µ) ≤ l̄) + P (V (l̄, µ) ≥ V (l′, µ)|l̄ < l∗(µ) ≤ l′)P (l̄ < l∗(µ) ≤ l′)
]
= P (l∗(µ) ≤ l̄)
= G(l̄)
Here the second and third equalities use the facts that for l′ > l̄:
P
(





V (l̄, µ) ≥ V (l′, µ)|l∗(µ) ≤ l̄
)
= 1
These follow from Propositions 3 and 8.
A similar argument shows that lim
l′↑l̄
C(l̄, l′) = G(l̄):
lim
l′↑l̄
C(l̄, l′) = lim
l′↑l̄




P (V (l′, µ) ≥ V (l̄, µ)|l∗(µ) ≤ l̄)P (l∗(µ) ≤ l′)















Here the last equality uses the continuity of G(l) for l 6= 0.5.
I now specify C(l, l′) in terms of the values of µ at which the sign of V (l, µ) > V (l′, µ) changes.
Let Z(l, l′) = (Z1(l, l
′), Z2(l, l
′)...Zn(l, l
′)) be the ascending-ordered (Z1(l, l
′) > Z2(l, l
′) >
... > Zn(l, l
′)) set of such values. Note that for l 6= l′ this set is finite (and non-empty, since
l, l′ ∈ L): since V (l, µ)− V (l′, µ) is continuous in µ except at 0.5, Z \ {0.5} is a subset of the
zeroes of that function, which are themselves a subset of the zeroes of a polynomial in µ.
The specification of C(l, l′) in terms of the members of Z(l, l′) will depend on whether the
sign of V (l, µ) > V (l′, µ) begins and ends positive or negative at the boundaries of [0, 1]. For









0 V (l, µ)− V (l′, µ) ≤ 0, ∀µ ∈]Zn(l, l′), 1]
1 otherwise







(−1)i−I0(l′,l)F (Zi) l′ < l





(−1)i−I0(l,l′)F (Zi) l′ > l
As noted above, the members of Z(l̄, l′) (other than 0.5 if it is a member of the set) are also
zeroes of V (l̄, µ)− V (l′, µ). In fact, all zeroes of this function at a given l′ are members of Z
unless they are also local extrema of the function, at which d
dµ
V (l̄, µ) = d
dµ
V (l′, µ). Using this
fact, it is possible to show that on certain domains, the non-0.5 members of Z(l̄, l′) are given
by functions that are differentiable in l′; specifically, by the solutions to particular initial
value problems.























V (l̄, µ)− d
dµ











Here X1 is the set of points (l
′, µ) at which V is not differentiable in l′. Note that all points
at which l′ = 0.5 are in X1, and when preferences are given by the state-matching utility
function X1 also contains points at which a posterior belief of 0.5 is possible
12. X2 is the set
of points (l′, µ) at which the function V (l̄, µ)− V (l′, µ) has a local extremum in µ. E is the
set of points (l′, µ) which are not in X1 or X2 and do not have l
′ equal to 0, 0.5, or 1.







V (l̄, µ)− d
dµ
V (l′, µ)
At any given l′ = l′0, I define a function zi(l
′; l̄, l′0) corresponding to each Zi(l̄, l
′
0) ∈ Z(l̄, l′0) as





′; l̄, l′0) = g(l
′, zi(l
′; l̄, l′0))




0) = Zi(l, l
′). The function exists and is unique by the Picard-













By the extension theorem for IVP solutions13, as each function zi(l
′; l̄, l′0) approaches either





approaches the boundary of E.















′; l̄, l′) : ∃l′ ∈ (l̄, 1), Zi(l̄, l′) = zi(l′; l̄, l′)
}
Ẑ(l̄, l′0) contains all the z functions generated by the members of Z(l̄, l
′
0) at a given l
′
0 (which
is every z function for which l′0 ∈ ω(z)), and Z̄ contains all such functions generated at any
point in (l̄, 1).
Lemma A.6. Two functions zi(l
′; l̄, l′0) and zj(l
′; l̄, l′0) with i 6= j do not intersect at any
point.





0) 6= zj(l′0; l̄, l′0)
12Because at such points the signal switches between affecting the consumer’s action or not, causing a
jump in dVdl .
13See Bell (2014) for a discussion of these theorems and further references.
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Now assume that the two functions intersect at some point x:
zi(x; l̄, l
′
0) = zj(x; l̄, l
′
0) = Zh(l̄, x)
Consider a z function defined at x, zh(l
′; l̄, x). On any interval containing x and within the
domain of zh(l
′; l̄, x), the restriction of zh(l
′; l̄, x) to that interval is the unique solution to the
initial value problem that defines zh(l
′; l̄, x). Restrictions of the original two functions also
solve the initial value problem on any such interval that falls within their domain, so the
three functions are equal at any point that falls within all three of their domains; the original
two functions must diverge outside of the domain of zh(l
′; l̄, x).
However, since the restrictions of the original two functions to any interval that falls within
their domains and includes x both solve the initial value problem at x, then if those functions
are defined beyond the bounds of zh(l
′; l̄, x) then the latter function does not have the maximal
interval of validity for solutions to the initial value problem at x, which contradicts its
definition. Therefore the point of intersection x cannot exist.
Call an open interval ]a, b[ ∈ [l̄, 1] a fixed-Z interval if both of the following hold for any
l′ ∈ ]a, b[ : {
µ̄ ∈ [0, 1] : lim
µ↑µ̄
V (l̄, µ)− V (l′, µ) = 0 ∩ (l′, µ̄) /∈ E
}
= ∅{
µ̄ ∈ [0, 1] : lim
µ↓µ̄
V (l̄, µ)− V (l′, µ) = 0 ∩ (l′, µ̄) /∈ E
}
= ∅
That is, a point l′ is only contained in a fixed-Z interval if any pair (l′, µ) that is a zero of
V (l̄, µ)−V (l′, µ) is in E, both the left and right limits at 0.5 of V (l̄, µ)−V (l′, µ) are non-zero,
and the limits of the same expression at 0 and 1 are also non-zero. Note that this definition
implies that on the interior of a fixed-Z interval, all elements of Z not equal to 0.5 are given
by z functions, since each non-0.5 element of Z(l̄, l′) must be a zero of V (l̄, µ)− V (l′, µ).
The next two Lemmas demonstrate that the elements of Z and their ordering are consistent
over such intervals, in the sense that if a particular element Zi is given by a particular z
function anywhere on a fixed-Z interval, it is given by the same function throughout the
interval, and if 0.5 is the jth element of Z anywhere on such an interval, it is the jth element
of Z over the entire interval.
I begin by establishing that if a z function is defined anywhere on a fixed-Z interval, it is
defined on the whole interval.
Lemma A.7. For any function z ∈ Z̄, neither boundary of its domain is contained in a
fixed-Z interval.
Proof. Consider the upper boundary of the domain of z, ω+(z). Let z+ denote the limit of z





By the extension theorem:
(ω+(z), z+) ∈ ∂E
Since E is an open set, this implies that:
(ω+(z), z+) /∈ E
Since at each l′ in the domain of z, V (l̄, z(l′))− V (l′, z(l′)) = 0, it is clear that:
lim
µ↑z+
V (l̄, µ)− V (ω+(z), µ) = 0
It follows from the definition of a fixed-Z interval that ω+(z) is not contained in one. The
argument for the lower boundary ω−(z) is analogous.
Lemmas A.6 and A.7 together imply that the same set of z functions are defined at any point
on a fixed-Z interval, and that their ordering is also consistent over the interval; i.e. if ]a, b[
is a fixed-Z interval and x, x′ ∈ ]a, b[, then zi(x; l̄, x) > zj(x; l̄, x) if and only if zi(x′; l̄, x) >
zj(x
′; l̄, x).
Lemma A.8. Let ]a, b[ be a fixed-Z interval. Then either 0.5 ∈ Z(l̄, l′) for all l′ ∈ ]a, b[, or
0.5 /∈ Z(l̄, l′) for all l′ ∈ ]a, b[.
Proof. Assume that two points x, x′ ∈ ]a, b[ exist such that 0.5 ∈ Z(l̄, x) and 0.5 /∈ Z(l̄, x′),
and that x can be chosen such that 0.5 = Zi(l̄, x), i 6= 1, i 6= n, where n = |Z(l̄, x)|.
This implies that functions zi−1(l
′; l̄, x) and zi+1(l
′; l̄, x) exist and that d
dµ
V (l̄, zi−1(x; l̄, x))−
d
dµ
V (x, zi−1(x; l̄, x)) and
d
dµ
V (l̄, zi+1(x; l̄, x))− ddµV (
′, zi+1(x; l̄, x)) have the same sign.
Since 0.5 /∈ Zi(l̄, x′), ddµV (l̄, zi−1(x
′; l̄, x))− d
dµ
V (x′, zi−1(x




′; l̄, x))− d
dµ
V (x′, zi+1(x
′; l̄, x)) must have opposite sign. This implies that one of
these two differences in derivatives must change sign on the interval [x, x′]. The z functions
do not go to 0.5 on a fixed-Z interval (any point (l′, 0.5) is in the boundary of E), so the
derivatives are continuous. However, the difference in the derivatives also does not go to 0
on a fixed-Z interval. Therefore they cannot change sign.
Now assume that x and x′ exist as before, but x cannot be chosen such that 0.5 = Zi(l̄, x), i 6=
1, i 6= n. This implies that either 0.5 = Z1(l̄, x) or 0.5 = Zn(l̄, x). It cannot be both, which
would make it the only element of Z(l̄, x): since 0.5 /∈ Z(l̄, x′) and Z(l̄, x′) is non-empty,
there exists a function z1(l
′; l̄, x′), and by Lemma A.7, z1(x; l̄, x
′) ∈ Z(l̄, x). Assume without
loss of generality that x < x′, that 0.5 = Z1(l̄, l
′)∀l′ ∈ [x, x′[ , and that d
dµ
V (l̄, z1(x




′; l̄, x′)) < 0. Since d
dµ
V (l̄, z1(l
′; l̄, x′))− d
dµ
V (l′, z1(l
′; l̄, x′)) cannot change sign on
a fixed-Z interval, these assumptions imply that for l′ ∈ [x, x′[ , V (l̄, µ) − V (l′, µ) ≤ 0∀µ ∈
(0, 0.5) and that V (l̄, µ) − V (x′, µ) ≥ 0, ∀µ ∈ (0, z1(x′; l̄, x′)). From this and the continuity
of V (l̄, µ)−V (l′, µ) in l′ for µ 6= 0.5 it follows that V (l̄, µ)−V (x′, µ) = 0, ∀µ ∈ (0, 0.5). This
clearly cannot hold for x′ 6= l̄, for either specification of V (l, µ).
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The preceding lemmas show that over a fixed-Z interval, any particular Zi is consistently
equal to either a particular z function or to 0.5. I now show that the remaining elements of
the specification of C(l̄, l′) are constant over a fixed-Z interval.
Lemma A.9. The values of I0(l̄, l
′) and I1(l̄, l
′) are constant on any fixed-Z interval.
Proof. Assume that a fixed-Z interval ]a, b[ exists such that for two points x, x′ ∈ ]a, b[ , x < x′,
I0(l̄, x) 6= I0(l̄, x′). Assume further that Z1(l̄, x) 6= 0.5, so that the function z1(x′; l̄, x′) exists.
Since ]a, b[ is a fixed-Z interval, z1(x
′; l̄, x′) = z1(x
′; l̄, x) 6= 0.5. Since I0(l̄, x) 6= I0(l̄, l′), this
implies that d
dµ








must have opposite sign. Since d
dµ
V (l̄, µ)) − d
dµ
V (l′, µ) is continuous in µ except at 0.5
and z1(l








′; l̄, x)) goes to 0 at some point on [x, x′] or that z1(l
′; l̄, x) goes to 0.5 at some
point on [x, x′]. Either contradicts the assumption that ]a, b[ is a fixed-Z interval.
Now assume that Z1(l̄, x) = 0.5. Since ]a, b[ is a fixed-Z interval, this implies that Z1(l̄, l
′) =
0.5∀l′ ∈ ]a, b[ . Assume without loss of generality that I0(l̄, l′) = I0(l̄, x′) = 1, ∀l′ ∈ [x, x′).
This implies that for l′ ∈ [x, x′[ , V (l̄, µ) − V (l′, µ) ≥ 0, ∀µ ∈ ]0, 0.5[ and that V (l̄, µ) −
V (x′, µ) ≤ 0, ∀µ ∈ ]0, 0.5[. From this and the continuity of V (l̄, µ)− V (l′, µ) in l′ for µ 6= 0.5
it follows that V (l̄, µ) − V (x′, µ) = 0, ∀µ ∈ ]0, 0.5[. This cannot hold for x′ 6= l̄, for either
specification of V (l, µ).
The argument for I1(l̄, l
′) is analogous.
The following two Lemmas establish that C(l̄, l′) is differentiable on (l̄, 1) except at a finite
number of points.
Lemma A.10. The set of points in ]l̄, 1[ not contained in a fixed-Z interval is finite.
Proof. Assume that some point x ∈ ]l̄, 1[ does not meet the criteria used in the definition of
a fixed-Z interval. That is, there exists some µ̄ ∈ [0, 1] such that (x, µ̄) /∈ E and that either
the left or right limit at µ̄ of V (l̄, µ)− V (x, µ) is 0. I will refer to the former requirement as
the boundary condition on (x, µ̄) and the latter as the limit indifference condition.
I will show that there are only a finite number of points x ∈ (l̄, 1) at which a µ̄ exists such
that (x, µ̄) satisfies both the boundary and limit indifference conditions.
The boundary condition implies that one of the following holds:
• µ̄ = 0
• µ̄ = 0.5
• µ̄ = 1
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• (x, µ̄) ∈ X1 ∪X2
In the first three cases it follows straightforwardly that the limit indifference condition holds
only at a finite set of values of x; substituting each of these three values of µ̄ into the condition
gives an equation for which the solutions are a subset of the roots of a polynomial.
In the case of (x, µ̄) ∈ X1 ∪ X2, note that it follows from Propositions 3 and 8 that for
a given µ̄, there is at most one x ∈ ]l̄, 1[ such that (x, µ̄) satisfies the limit indifference
condition. Solving for this x and substituting into the conditions for (x, µ̄) ∈ X1 (posterior
belief resulting from the less-likely report must be equal to 0.5) or (x, µ̄) ∈ X2 (must have
d
dµ
V (l̄, µ̄)− d
dµ
V (x, µ̄) = 0) yields in each case an equation in µ̄ with solutions that are subsets
of roots of a polynomial.
Since there are a finite number of solutions in each case, the set of points (x, µ̄) that meet
both conditions is finite.
Lemma A.11. C(l̄, l′) is differentiable on any fixed-Z interval.
Proof. Lemmas A.6 through A.9 establish that on a fixed-Z interval, the only elements of
the specification of C(l̄, l′) that vary with l′ are terms of the form F (zi(l
′)) (the coefficients
of these terms remain fixed over the interval since I0 is constant and the ordering of the
elements of Z is maintained). Since F is differentiable and each z function is differentiable,
C(l̄, l′) is differentiable on a fixed-Z interval.
At the finite number of points in ]l̄, 1[ not contained in fixed-Z intervals, C(l̄, l′) may not be
differentiable, but I will show that it is at least continuous. I will argue for left-continuity;
the argument for right-continuity is analogous.
It will be useful to consider an arbitrary point x ∈ ]l̄, 1[ that is not contained in a fixed-Z
interval. As there are a finite number of points x which are boundary points of a z function
and therefore not contained in a fixed-Z interval, it follows that each such point is a boundary
point of fixed-Z intervals; that is, there exist a < x and b > x such that ]a, x[ and ]x, b[ are
fixed-Z intervals. In the following arguments I will use a′ to denote an arbitrary point in the
interior of a fixed-Z interval ]a, x[, and I will use the following notation in order to refer easily





Lemma A.12. For each Zi(l̄, x) ∈ Z(l̄, x), ∃j such that lim
l′↑x
Zj(l̄, l
′) = Zi(l̄, x)
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that d
dµ
V (l̄, Zi(l̄, x)) − ddµV (x, Zi(l̄, x)) < 0. That
is, that the sign of V (l̄, µ) − V (x, µ) changes from positive to negative at Zi(l̄, x). Assume
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also without loss of generality that on some small fixed-Z interval with x as its upper bound,
say ]x− δ, x[ , V (l̄, Zi(l̄, x))− V (l′, Zi(l̄, x)) < 014. This implies that for any µ̂ less than but
sufficiently close to Zi(l̄, x), there exists an x
′ ∈ ]x− δ, x[ such that V (l̄, µ̂)−V (x′, µ̂) < 0 and
V (l̄, µ̂)) − V (x, µ̂) > 0. Let Zj be the closest sign change point for l′ = x − δ that is below
Zi(l̄, x); that is:
j = max {n ∈ |Z(l̄, x− δ)| : Zn(l̄, x− δ) < Zi(l̄, x)}
By the continuity of V (l̄, µ) − V (l′, µ), for any µ̂ less than but sufficiently close to Zi(l̄, x),
there exists an ε such that:
V (l̄, µ̂)− V (l′, µ̂) > 0,∀ l′ ∈ ]x− ε, x[




′) = Zi(l̄, x)
Note that if Zi(l̄, x) 6= 0.5, Lemma A.12 implies that there exists a function zj ∈ Ẑ(l̄, a′) such
that:
zxj = Zi(l̄, x)
If Zi(l̄, x) = 0.5, then the Lemma implies either the existence of a zj function with zxj = 0.5,
or that 0.5 ∈ Z(l̄, a′).
Lemma A.13. If there exists a function zi ∈ Ẑ(l̄, a′) such that x = ω+(zi) and zxi is not
equal to 0, 0.5, 1, or a local extremum of V (l̄, µ)− V (x, µ), then zxi ∈ Z(l̄, x).
Proof. For any l′ ∈ ]a, x[ , V (l̄, zi(l′)) − V (l′, zi(l′)) = 0. It follows from the continuity of




′))− V (l′, zi(l′)) = 0
V (l̄, zxi)− V (x, zxi) = 0
Since zxi is a zero of V (l̄, µ) − V (x, µ), is in the interior of that function’s domain, and by
assumption is not a local extremum of the function or at a point of discontinuity, it must be
a sign change point.
Lemma A.14. If µ̄ is a local extremum of V (l̄, µ) − V (x, µ), then the following set has an
even number of members:
{zi ∈ Ẑ(l̄, a′) zxi = µ̄}
That is, if x is the upper bound of the domain of some z function because the function
approaches a local extremum point at x, then there are an even number of z functions that
approach that local extremum point at x.
14The argument is analogous if the function is positive on ]x − δ, x[ . If it is constantly zero on ]x − δ, x[
then the argument is trivial.
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′)) < 0 for any l′ ∈ ω(zi) (recall that the sign of this derivative is
either always negative or always positive for a given z function); that is, zi gives a positive-
to-negative sign-change point. Assume further that (x, zxi) is a local minimum of V (l̄, µ) −
V (l′, µ). Clearly zxi /∈ Z(l̄, x), as a local extremum with no discontinuity cannot be a sign
change point. Consider the following (potential) member of Z(l̄, x):
Znext = min {Z ∈ Z(l̄, x) : Z > zxi}
By Lemma A.12, if Znext exists, it is the limit of some zj ∈ Ẑ(l̄, a′), j > i. Since zxi is a
local minimum, Znext must give a positive-to-negative sign change. Since zi+1, if it exists,
must always give a negative-to-positive sign change, zj 6= zi+1(l′; l̄, a′), which implies that
zx(i+1) /∈ Z(l̄, x) and zx(i+1) < Znext. Now assume that zi+1 exists and that zxi 6= zx(i+1), and
consider the following identity for some y > 1, which follows from the continuity of V away






)− V (l′, zi(l
′)+zi+1(l′)
y
) = V (l̄,
zxi+zx(i+1)
y






∈ ]zxi, Znext[ , the right hand side of the above equation is weakly positive.
As V (l̄, µ) − V (x, µ) is not constantly zero on any interval, there exists some y for which
it is strictly positive. Since the expression inside the limit on the left hand side of the
equation is weakly negative for any l′ ∈ ]a, x[ , the limit is weakly negative for any y. This
is a contradiction, so zxi = zx(i+1) if zi+1 exists. If zi+1 does not exist, then either zi is
the last member of Ẑ(l̄, a′) or Zi+1(l̄, a
′) = 0.5. In either case a similar argument applies
to demonstrate a contradiction; for example, if zi is the last member of Ẑ(l̄, a
′) then the






)− V (l′, zi(l
′)+1
y
) = V (l̄, zxi+1
y
)− V (x, zxi+1
y
)
As before, the right-hand side must be strictly positive for some y while the left-hand side is
weakly negative. For the other case, the same argument applies to the analogous expression
using the point zxi+0.5
y
.
These arguments demonstrate that whenever a z function that gives a positive-to-negative
sign change point approaches a local extremum, so does a consecutive z function that gives
a negative-to-positive sign change point. If more than two functions approach the same local
extremum, assuming that the total number that do so is odd and following an analogous
argument using the first and last of those functions yields a contradiction in the same way.
Analogous arguments apply using zx(i−1) when (x, zxi) is a local maximum of V (l̄, µ)−V (l′, µ),
or if it is a local minimum but zi gives a negative-to-positive sign change point.
Lemma A.15. 0.5 ∈ Z(l̄, a′) ∩ 0.5 /∈ Z(l̄, x) if and only if the following set has an odd
number of members:
{zi ∈ Ẑ(l̄, a′) zxi = 0.5}
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Proof. Let 0.5 = Zj(l̄, a
′) and assume without loss of generality that it is a positive-to-
negative sign change point. Assume also that 0.5 /∈ Z(l̄, x) because the sign of V (l̄, µ) −
V (x, µ) is weakly positive on an interval (0.5 − ε, 0.5 + ε), and finally that zx(j+1) 6= 0.5.







)− V (l′, 0.5+zj+1(l
′)
y
) = V (l̄,
0.5+zx(j+1)
y
)− V (x, 0.5+zx(j+1)
y
)
Given the assumptions, the expression inside the limit on the left-hand side is weakly negative
for any l′ ∈ ]a, x[, and for some y the right-hand side is strictly positive - a contradiction. If
zj+1 does not exist, then the same argument applies for an analogous expression using any
fixed µ between 0.5 and 1. For example:
lim
l′↑x
V (l̄, 0.75)− V (l′, 0.75) = V (l̄, 0.75)− V (x, 0.75)
To see that the number of z functions that approach 0.5 must be odd, note that if zx(j+2)








If V (l̄, µ)−V (x, µ) is weakly negative in an interval around x, an analogous argument applies
beginning with zj−1 instead of zj+1.
In the converse direction, assume again that 0.5 = Zj(l̄, a
′) and that it is a positive-to-
negative sign change point. Assume also that an odd number of z functions approach 0.5
at x. Additionally, assume without loss of generality that an even number of z functions
approach 0.5 from below, and an odd number from above. Let Zprev be the largest member
of Z(l̄, x) that is less than 0.5, if one exists, and let Znext be the smallest member of Z(l̄, x)
that is greater than 0.5, if one exists. If Zprev exists, it is equal to zx(j−1−m), with m even.
To see this, note that m is the number of z functions below 0.5 that either approach 0.5 at x
(an even number by assumption) or approach a local extremum of V (l̄, µ)−V (x, µ) between
Zprev and 0.5 (shown to be even above). This implies that Zprev is a negative-to-positive sign
change point and that V (l̄, µ) − V (x, µ) is weakly positive on some interval ]0.5 − ε, 0.5[ .
The same logic applied above 0.5 shows that Znext, if it exists, is a negative-to-positive sign
change point and that V (l̄, µ) − V (x, µ) is weakly positive on some interval ]0.5, 0.5 + ε[ .
Therefore, on the assumption that Zprev and Znext both exist, 0.5 /∈ Z(l̄, x).
If Zprev does not exist, then all zi functions in Ẑ(l̄, a
′) with i < j must either approach 0, 0.5,
or a local extremum of V (l̄, µ)− V (x, µ) at x. Assume without loss of generality that there
are an even number of such functions (that j is odd). This implies that I0(l̄, a
′) = 1. Since,
as argued above, an even number of z functions approach 0.5 from below at x or approach a
local extremum at x, an even number of functions must approach 0. Let zh be the largest of
those functions. That is:
h = max{i ∈ |Ẑ(l̄, a′)|} : zxi = 0}
Since h is even and I0(l̄, a
′) = 1, zh gives a negative-to-positive sign change point. Now











) = V (l̄,
zx(h+1)
y




Since zh gives a negative-to-positive sign change point, the expression inside the limit on the
left hand side is weakly positive for any l′ ∈]a, x[. Therefore the expression on the right-hand
side is weakly positive, and since there are no members of Z(l̄, x) that are less than 0.5,
V (l̄, µ)− V (x, µ) is weakly positive on ]0, 0.5[ , and the argument is the same as in the case
where Zprev exists. An analogous argument applies if Znext does not exist.
Lemma A.16. I0(l̄, a
′) 6= I0(l̄, x) if and only if the following set has an odd number of
members:
{zi ∈ Ẑ(l̄, a′) zxi = 0}
Lemma A.17. I1(l̄, a
′) 6= I1(l̄, x) if and only if the following set has an odd number of
members:
{zi ∈ Ẑ(l̄, a′) zxi = 1}
The proofs of lemmas A.16 and A.17 are analogous to that of A.15; note that, for example,
I0(l̄, a
′) = 1 and I0(l̄, a
′) = 0 implies that Z1(l̄, a
′) is a positive-to-negative sign change point
and Z1(l̄, x) a negative-to-positive sign change point.
Lemma A.18. C(l̄, l′) is continuous at x.















Note that the limit of the summation on the left-hand-side above can be rewritten as a sum






























Lemmas A.12 through A.17 demonstrate that, since F is continuous, for each Zi ∈ Z(l̄, x),
there exists a Zj ∈ Z(l̄, a′) such that:
lim
l′↑x
(−1)j−I0(l̄,a′)F (Zj(l̄, l′)) = (−1)i−I0(l̄,x)F (Zi(l̄, x))
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The equality of the coefficients follows from the fact that if i is even and j odd or vice versa,
I0(l̄, a
′) 6= I0(l̄, x) by Lemma A.16, as zi functions with i < j and zxi /∈ Z(l̄, x) must approach
local extrema (an even number of functions - Lemma A.14), 0.5 (either an even number of
functions or 0.5 is in exactly one of Z(l̄, a′) and Z(l̄, x) - Lemma A.15), or 0.
Now consider those zi ∈ Ẑ(l̄, a′) for which zxi /∈ Z(l̄, x). Assuming that if 0.5 ∈ Z(l̄, a′)
then 0.5 ∈ Z(l̄, x), continuity holds if the sum of the expression (−1)i−I0(l̄,a′)F (zxi) over these
functions is equal to I1(l̄, x) − I1(l̄, a′). The sum of the expression over any even number of
consecutive zi functions with the same limit at x is 0, so the sum over all zi functions that
approach local extrema at x is 0 by Lemma A.14. F (0) = 0, so the sum over all zi functions
with zxi = 0 is also 0. If an even number of zi functions have zxi = 1, the expression also
sums to zero over those functions, and I0(l̄, x) = I1(l̄, a
′), so continuity holds. If an odd
number of functions have zxi = 1, the expression sums to 0 over all but one of them; say the
last one (highest i). Since F (1) = 1, the single remaining limit is equal to 1 if I1(l̄, a
′) = 0,
and −1 if I1(l̄, a′) = 0 15. As an odd number of z functions approach 1 at x, this is equal to
I1(l̄, x)− I1(l̄, a′), and left-continuity holds.
The remaining case is when 0.5 = Zj(l̄, a
′) and 0.5 /∈ Z(l̄, x). In this case the argument
is identical, save that by Lemma A.15 there must be an odd number of zi functions with
zxi = 0.5. In the limit one of these cancels out the term (−1)j−I0(l̄,a
′)F (0.5), and the expression
(−1)i−I0(l̄,a′)F (zxi) sums to zero over the remaining even number of functions with zxi = 0.5.
Therefore left-continuity holds in every case.
It can be shown by symmetrical arguments that results analogous to Lemmas A.12 through
A.17 hold for a fixed-Z interval ]x, b[ and z functions with ω−(z) = x. Right-continuity follows
straightforwardly.
Lemma A.19. For a fixed l̄, C(l̄, l′) is continuous on ]l̄, 1[ , and is differentiable on ]l̄, 1)
except at a finite number of points.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas A.10, A.10, and A.18.
Lemma A.20. For a fixed l̄, C(l̄, l′) is continuous on (0, l̄), and is differentiable on (0, l̄)
except at a finite number of points.
Proof. The arguments for Lemma A.19 also apply on the interval (0, l̄).
With these characteristics of C established, the remainder of the proof largely follows the
proof of Proposition 3 of Osborne and Pitchik (1986), which proves the analogous result for
a one-dimensional location model in which the distribution of consumers is atomless, and
consumers select the nearest firm. Some adaptations are required to handle the facts that C
is not differentiable everywhere and that the distribution of consumer preferences may have
an atom at 0.5.
15This holds because i− I0(l̄, a′) is even if Zi(l̄, a′) is a positive-to-negative sign change point, and odd if
it is negative-to-positive
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Let Hn be the CDF corresponding to the symmetric equilibrium mixed strategy with n firms.
I first note that where G is continuous, so is Hn.
Lemma A.21. For n > 2, the symmetric equilibrium strategy Hn(l) is atomless except
possibly at l = 0.5.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 of Osborne and Pitchik (1986), which shows that any point
in their strategy space is an atom of the equilibrium strategies of at most two firms, can be
applied in this setting at a point l̄ ∈ L if C(l̄, l′) is continuous at l′ = l̄. By Lemma A.5, this
holds for L̄ 6= 0.5.
Given Lemma A.21, the expected payoff of a firm locating at a point l̄ 6= 0.5 when the n− 1
other firms all follow a mixed strategy with CDF Hn, P (l, Hn), is given by:
P (l, Hn) = (n− 1)
∫ l
0





















Note that since Hn is atomless away from 0.5, equilibrium requires that P (l, Hn) = 1/n
almost everywhere. As P (l, Hn) is continuous in l, this implies that P (l, Hn) = 1/n for all
l ∈ suppHn.
I define the following sets:
D(l) = {l′ ∈ ]0, l[ : @ ∂
∂l′
C2(l, l
′)} ∩ {0, l}
D̄(l) = {l′ ∈ ]l, 1[ : @ ∂
∂l′
C2(l, l
′)} ∩ {l, 1}
These sets are finite by Lemmas A.19 and A.20. Denote by Di(l) and D̄i(l) the ith element
of the each set when ordered by size, i.e. D(l) = {D1(l), D2(l) ... Dm(l)} with 0 = D1(l) <
D2(l) ... < Dm(l) = 1. Splitting up the integrals in the expected payoff using the members
of the D sets as limits, integrating by parts and applying the Binomial theorem gives:
















(l, u)(1 +Hn(l)−Hn(u))n−1 du
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Combining the fact that P (l, Hn) = 1/n for all l ∈ suppHn with Proposition 5 and the
continuity of nP (l, Hn) in l gives:
lim
n→∞
nP (l, Hn) = 1,∀ l ∈ suppG
Using the expression for P (l, Hn):
















(l, u)(1− (Hn(u)−Hn(l)))n−1 du
If l is on the interior of the support of G, 0 < H(l) < 1 by Proposition 5. It follows that








It follows that the first two terms in the above expression for nP (l, Hn) go to 0 as n→∞.
For the integrals in the expression, I apply Lemma 2 of Osborne and Pitchik (1986). The
Lemma states that for c > 0 and n = 1, 2..., with functions fn : [0, c] → [0, 1], f : [0, c] →
[0, 1], g : [0, c]→ R that are nondecreasing and twice continuously differentiably, with fn(0) =






∞ f ′(0) = 0, g′(0) > 0
g′(0)
f ′(0)
f ′(0) > 0
As part of their proof of this Lemma, Osborne and Pitchik also establish that for 0 < ε < c,




g′(x)(1− fn(x))n−1 dx→ 0
Appropriate substitutions allow these results to be applied to each of the integrals in the
two summations. For the integrals in the first summation, c = Di+1(l), x = l − u, g(x) =
−C(l, l − x), and fn(x) = Hn(l) − Hn(l − x). For the integrals in the second summation,
c = D̄i+1(l) − z, x = u − l, g(x) = C(l, l + x), and fn(x) = Hn(l + x) − Hn(l). The first




, and the rest go to zero. Since, as noted above,























It follows that at any l in suppG not equal to 0.5, h(l) = g(l). Since H and G are equal at
the upper and lower bounds of suppG, they are equal at any l not equal to 0.5. Since they
are CDFs, they must also be equal at l = 0.5.
Proof of Proposition 7
Lemmas 6 and 7 imply that the unique consumer-optimal signal can be found by maximising
the following function with respect to β:








β − β2(1− µ)
) 1




Since this function is concave by Lemma 7, it has a unique maximum either at the boundary of





















That this condition is satisfied by β̂(µ; ρ) can be verified by substitution. The concavity of
E(U |(1, β)) implies that β = 1 is optimal where β̂(µ; ρ) is greater than 1.
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Chapter 2
How Informed Should Voters Be?
2.1 Introduction
When decisions are made through voting, the voters are typically imperfectly informed about
the choices they are voting on. Faced with propaganda, fake news, or simply a lack of
information about the potential effects of voting outcomes, it is natural to consider the
potential benefits of providing voters with more accurate information. A social planner
may be able to improve the accuracy of voters’ information through a variety of channels,
such as direct information provision, active research into outcomes, or regulation of media
organisations.
However, if this social planner is utilitarian, voting carries its own problems. Even when
much-discussed issues of strategic voting are avoiding by limiting a ballot to a binary choice,
the fact that the decision rule does not make use of information about voters’ cardinal
preferences1 leads to ‘tyranny of the majority’ effects, in which the weak preferences of a
majority outweigh the strong preferences of a minority, to a point at which total utility
would be increased by reversing the decision. A considerable literature addresses potential
solutions to this problem that can be applied over multiple votes, whether by allowing voters
to trade votes (Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Casella and Palfrey (2019)), allowing them to
store votes to use on future issues (Casella (2005), Casella and Gelman (2008)), charging them
appropriately-structured costs for increasing numbers of votes (Lalley and Weyl (2018)), or
allowing them to abstain when voting is costly (Borgers (2004)).
In this paper, I show that restricting voter information in certain ways can also address
these problems even when there is only a single vote (or when voters cannot be tracked
across votes), and potentially increase total expected utility, demonstrating that it is not
necessarily the case that the better informed the voters are, the better the outcome. When
1In fact it cannot make use of them if the outcome is binary, valuations are independent, and incentive-
compatibility is required.
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voters have imperfect information about their valuations of the choices on a ballot, they
sometimes make ‘mistakes’, voting for a particular option when they would prefer another
if they knew their valuation with certainty. When the information structure is such that
mistakes are primarily or exclusively made by relatively-ambivalent voters, the occurrence
of ‘tyranny of the majority’ outcomes can be reduced relative to the case in which voters
are perfectly informed. On the other hand, when voters make mistakes, the quality of the
information about preferences provided to the decision-making mechanism, the vote, declines.
This is the trade-off faced by a utilitarian social planner who can influence the information
available to voters.
The model of this paper involves a binary vote over two outcomes, using simple majority
rule. Voters have a shared, commonly-known valuation of one of the outcomes (the ‘status
quo’). Their valuations of the other outcome are independent and identically distributed.
A social planner selects the information structure through which voters learn about their
own valuations. This information structure consists of a stochastic mapping from a voter’s
valuation to a probability distribution on a set of messages; the voters observe the choice of
information structure, and update their beliefs rationally on receiving a message.
The planner in this model faces some fundamental restrictions, in that she is limited to
information structures that condition the messages a voter receives on that voter’s own
valuation. That is, she cannot send messages that only provide aggregate information about
valuations. If she could, it would be straightforward to implement first-best in this setting,
by sending messages that simply indicated to every voter which outcome would maximise
total utility.
The assumption that this is not possible, as well as the assumption that voter valuations are
independent, is intended to situate this model as one in which voters ‘care about different
things’. In reality, a given agent’s valuation of some possible voting outcome depends on both
the effects of the outcome, and the agent’s preferences over those effects. As the range of
possible preferences agents may have becomes more diversely distributed, information about
the effects of an outcome becomes less and less informative about the valuation of a randomly
chosen agent, if the preferences of that agent are unknown. A planner lacking knowledge
of those preferences can still control how the agent learns about their own valuation, by
controlling the information they receive about the effects of the policy. But this does not
give the planner direct access to the valuations themselves, so she cannot aggregate them.
To do so, she must elicit information about preferences from the agents, which is what the
vote does!
The model of this paper captures such a scenario by applying the restrictions described above
to the planner. Subject to these restrictions, I otherwise grant the planner extensive powers in
choosing the information structure. This does allow the use of complex information structures
unlikely to be plausible in practice. However, this is of limited concern given my results. The
optimal structures I derive are always simple partitions of the space of valuations, with a
small number of possible messages.
When abstentions are prohibited, I show that perfect information is optimal if and only if a
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simple symmetry condition on the distribution of valuations holds: that in expectation, the
degree to which voters for one policy prefer it to the other is equal to the degree to which
voters in the reverse direction prefer the reverse outcome. In other words, the expected benefit
to voters for a given outcome of their chosen outcome is equalised across the two outcomes.
If this condition holds, ‘tyranny of the majority’ outcomes still occur, but restricting voter
information cannot reduce them: reducing their incidence in favour of one outcome is always
offset by increasing it in the other. Otherwise the optimal information structure induces
some of the most ambivalent voters for one of the options to vote incorrectly. This reduces
the difference between the expected benefit of winning for voters on the two sides. If an
information structure exists which eliminates this difference altogether (existence depends
on whether the space of valuations is large enough), then the optimal information structure
approaches it as the number of voters grows large. These results mirror the emphasis on
expected benefits of winning a vote in the literature on optimal binary voting mechanisms;
in Azrieli and Kim (2014), optimal voting rules weight each voter by the benefit they derive
from their preferred outcome winning.
If indifferent voters abstain from the vote, then the planner gains more power, since she can
design an information structure that sends some voters indifference-inducing messages, re-
sulting in abstention2. In this case, restriction of information can be beneficial even when the
symmetry condition is met and perfect information would be optimal in the no-abstentions
case. I show that for symmetrical valuation distributions with abstentions, perfect infor-
mation is never optimal if the number of voters is large enough. The optimal information
structures here induce the most ambivalent voters to abstain, providing an effect on partic-
ipation that is essentially equivalent to adding a cost to voting, but may be possible when
the imposition of a cost is not (in the case of monetary costs, variation in wealth may make
the imposition of uniform costs impossible, or social and political obstacles may prevent the
use of such mechanisms).
The planner’s commitment to an information structure which is observed by the voters
connects this model to the information design literature, in which a sender commits to an
information structure, observable to a receiver, that ‘persuades’ the receiver in a way that is
beneficial to the sender. Building from the single-sender single-receiver model of Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2008), this literature includes several voting models. Closest to the model
of this paper is that of Van Straeten and Yamashita (2019), which similarly considers a
utilitarian sender, but does not restrict her to information structures that condition on a
voter’s own valuation only. They include an additive private component to voters’ valuations,
which prevents the sender straightforwardly implementing first-best. They show that in many
cases a signal structure that simply reports the average of the accessible component of the
valuations is still optimal despite the presence of the private component.
Other voting papers in the information design literature typically focus on a sender who
wishes to persuade voters to select a particular option. For example, Bardhi and Guo (2017)
analyze the case of a sender who wishes to persuade a group of voters to take a certain
2Inducing such a precise belief may be challenging in reality, but approximate indifference is sufficient if
voting carries small inherent costs.
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decision, using private signals, when the voters are ex-ante heterogeneous in their ‘thresholds
of doubt’ (how much convincing they require to approve the decision). Similarly, Alonso and
Camara (2016) also consider how a sender can influence a vote towards a particular outcome,
in this case using a public signal and majority rule with varying thresholds. The model of
this paper differs in that the sender (the planner) is motivated by the interests of the voters
in aggregate. This creates a motive for the information structure to be informative, since the
planner cares about the preferences of voters and has a need for them to be informed about
their preferences in order to make use of that information, rather than just to manipulate
their beliefs. In fact, the planner in this model is something of a redundant figure. Since
the voters are ex ante identical, the optimal information structures I derive are ones that the
voters would agree to commit to ex ante, if they are expected utility maximisers.
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 introduce the structure of the baseline model with mandatory voting
and describe the planner’s problem. Section 2.2.3 presents results on optimal information
structures, which Section 2.2.4 generalises to voting mechanisms with differing thresholds.
Section 2.3 considers non-mandatory voting, allowing for abstentions. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Baseline Model with Mandatory Voting
2.2.1 Structure and Timing
A social planner determines the information structure facing Q agents, Q odd, who will vote
on whether to implement a policy. The outcome is binary: either the policy is implemented
(outcome Y ) or it is not (outcome N). If the outcome is N , each agent receives an identical
commonly-known payoff, v. I assume without loss of generality that v ≥ 0. Agent’s payoffs
if the outcome is Y vary across agents and are uncertain ex-ante; I denote agent i’s utility
under Y by θi. Values of θi are drawn IID from a continuous distribution on a closed interval
Θ = [θ, θ̄], v ∈ (θ, θ̄), with a differentiable and strictly increasing cumulative distribution
function F . E(θi) is normalised to 0.
The timing of the model is as follows:
• The social planner publicly commits to a signal structure.
• The agents receive private messages and update their beliefs about their payoffs.
• The agents vote on whether to implement the policy.
• The result of the vote is implemented and agents receive their payoffs.
The social planner determines how much information the agents will receive about their own
payoffs before they vote. Specifically, she selects a signal structure, which is a set S = {M,G},
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where M is a finite set of messages and G : Θ→ ∆M an F -measurable function that assigns
a probability distribution over messages to each possible true valuation θ. I use g to denote
the resulting conditional probabilities of messages given valuations. That is, for any message





Given G, applying Bayes’ rule on receipt of a particular message m generates a posterior












As discussed in the introduction, the information structure the planner chooses maps from
a single valuation to probabilities over messages. She cannot condition the messages a voter
receives on the valuations of other voters.
The planner’s choice of signal structure is public and made with full commitment - agents
are fully aware of the properties of the signal structure she selects, and she cannot alter it or
distort the information provided at any later stage.
The planner’s objective is to maximise the ex ante expected sum of agent utilities. Since
agents are ex ante identical, it is equivalent to treat the planner as maximising the ex ante
expected utility of a single agent. I will denote this expectation by Ū(S):
Ū(S) = v +
∑
m∈M
(E(θ|m)− v)P (Y |m)P (m)
Once agents receive a message, they update their beliefs about their valuation θi according to
Bayes’ rule and the properties of the signal structure S. They then take an action ai ∈ {y, n}
(their vote). I use P (Y ) to denote the probability that outcome Y wins the vote under
signal structure; that is, the probability that greater than Q−1
2
voters receive messages that
induce them to vote y. Consequently, P (Y |m) denotes the probability that outcome Y wins
conditional on a single voter having received message m (and voted accordingly). The vote
induced by a message m follows straightforwardly from E(θ|m), as I will describe in detail
below.
Note that this setup assumes that voting is mandatory, an assumption I will revisit in Sec-
tion 2.3. The policy outcome is determined by majority vote. Agents choose their action
3Where I refer to multiple signal structures in later results and proofs, I follow this lowercase convention.
For example, if the function assigning distributions over messages is G′, g′ denotes the resulting conditional
probabilities, and so on.
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to maximise their expected utility given the beliefs induced by the message they received
(randomizing 50-50 if indifferent).
2.2.2 The Planner’s Problem
Given that the vote is binary, agents’ strategies are relatively trivial; it is the planner’s choice
of information structure that is of primary interest. Denoting the message received by agent
i by mi, an agent’s action is simply determined by the posterior expectation of θi given the
message mi.
P (ai = y|mi) =

0 E(θi|mi) < v
0.5 E(θi|mi) = v
1 E(θi|mi) > v
The fact that votes are entirely determined by the sign of E(θi|mi)−v simplifies the planner’s
problem, as it provides a straightforward relationship between the posterior beliefs induced
by messages and the resulting votes. Proposition 1 demonstrates that since there are only
two actions, then by a revelation principle-type argument I can focus on signal structures
with only two messages in which the messages are action recommendations.
Proposition 1. Let S = {M,G} be a signal structure, with |M | > 2. Then there exists a
signal structure S ′ = {M ′, G′} such that |M ′| = 2 and Ū(S ′) = Ū(S).
Proof. First note that since messages carry no information about the actions of other agents,
then if two messages m and m′ induce the same action, it follows that P (Y |m) = P (Y |m′).
Divide M into three subsets as follows:
My = {m ∈M : E(θ|m) > v}
Mn = {m ∈M : E(θ|m) < v}
Md = {m ∈M : E(θ|m) = v}
All messages in My induce a y vote, all messages in Mn induce an n vote, and all messages
in Md induce randomization. Therefore, using the fact that E(θ|m ∈Md)− v = 0, Ū(S) can
be written as:
Ū(S) = v + P (Y |a = y, S)P (m ∈My)(E(θ|m ∈My)− v)
+ P (Y |a = n, S)P (m ∈Mn)(E(θ|m ∈Mn)− v)
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Construct S ′ as follows:


















P (m′ = y) = P (m ∈My) + 12P (m ∈Md)
P (m′ = n) = P (m ∈Mn) + 12P (m ∈Md)
(E(θ|m′ = y)− v)P (m′ = y) = (E(θ|m ∈My)− v)P (m ∈My)
(E(θ|m′ = n)− v)P (m′ = n) = (E(θ|m ∈Mn)− v)P (m ∈Mn)
Clearly the probability that any other voter votes y is the same under S ′ as under S, and it
follows that P (Y |a = y, S ′) = P (Y |a = y, S). Therefore:
Ū(S ′) = v + P (Y |a = y, S ′)P (m′ = y)(E(θ|m′ = y)− v)
+ P (Y |a = n, S ′)P (m′ = n)(E(θ|m′ = n)− v)
= v + P (Y |a = y, S)P (m ∈My)(E(θ|m ∈My)− v)
+ P (Y |a = n, S)P (m ∈Mn)(E(θ|m ∈Mn)− v)
= Ū(S)
I will restrict attention from this point on to binary signal structures in which M = {y, n},
E(θi|mi = y) ≥ v, and E(θi|mi = n) ≤ v. That is, structures in which the messages are
action recommendations and it is incentive compatible for voters to follow the recommenda-
tions they receive. For brevity, I will denote E(θi|mi = m) under a signal structure S by
θ̂S(m), and the probability of an event X under a signal structure S by PS(X). In these
probabilities references to y and m may be taken as denoting either the message or the re-
sulting action (since for these information structures receiving a message always results in
taking the corresponding action). Probabilities conditional on a message/action are given for
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a single agent; for example, PS(Y |y) is the probability that the outcome is Y given that one
particular agent votes y.
Using the fact that for any S, θ̂S(y)PS(y) + θ̂S(n)PS(n) = 0, it will be useful to rewrite Ū as
follows:










PS(Y |y)− PS(Y |n)
)
PS(y)θ̂S(y)
This reformulation breaks down an agent’s expected utility into two parts corresponding
to the two outcomes. The first term straightforwardly captures the known payoff of v for
the N outcome. The second term expresses the potential for benefiting from a Y outcome.
If the agent could not influence the outcome, this would be 0, since E(θ) = 0. However,
since the agent gets a vote, the probability of Y depends on the agent’s payoff. The term(
PS(Y |y)−PS(Y |n)
)
PS(y) gives the probability that the agent votes y and in doing so changes
the outcome of the vote (her vote is pivotal). The θ̂S(y) term gives the expected benefit to
the agent of affecting the outcome in this way.
I will denote the impact of an agent’s vote on P (Y ), given S, by ρ(S):
ρ(S) = PS(Y |y)− PS(Y |n)
This gives:
Ū(S) = vPS(N) + ρ(S)PS(y)θ̂S(y)
The above formulation of Ū(S) implies that for a fixed P (y), Ū is increasing in θ̂(y). This
leads to Lemma 1, which implies that optimality can be achieved within an even simpler
class of signal structures, that of monotone partitions. A binary signal structure with
M = {y, n} is a monotone partition if there exists a cut-off x such that n is sent whenever θ
is below x and y is sent whenever θ is above x. That is, ∃x ∈ Θ such that:
g(n|θ) = 1− g(y|θ) =
{
1 θ ≤ x
0 θ > x




with θ̂(y) ≥ θ̂(n), there exists




such that S ′ is a monotone partition, PS′(y) =
PS(y), and θ̂S′(y) ≥ θ̂S(y).




with PS′(y) = PS(y), as there exists some cut-off x with F (x) = 1− PS(h). I now show that
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for any such S ′, θ̂S′(h) ≥ θ̂S(h):
PS(y) = P (θ > x)
PS(y|θ ≤ x)P (θ < x) + PS(y|θ > x)P (θ > x) = P (θ > x)
PS(y|θ ≤ x)P (θ < x) =
(
1− PS(y|θ > x)
)
P (θ > x)
PS(y|θ ≤ x)P (θ < x) = PS(n|θ > x)P (θ > x)
PS(y|θ ≤ x)P (θ < x)
P (θ > x)
= PS(n|θ > x)
PS(y|θ ≤ x)P (θ < x)
PS(y)
= PS(n|θ > x)
PS(θ ≤ x|y) = PS(n|θ > x)
Using this equality along with PS(y|θ > x) = PS(θ > x|y) and applying the law of total
expectation to the difference θ̂S′(y)− θ̂S(y) gives:
θ̂S′(y)− θ̂S(y) = E(θ|S ′, y)− E(θ|S, y)
= E(θ|θ > x)− E(θ|S, y)
= E(θ|θ > x, S, y)PS(y|θ > x) + E(θ|θ > x, S, n)PS(n|θ > x)
−
(
E(θ|θ > x, S, y)PS(θ > x|y) + E(θ|θ ≤ x, S, y)PS(θ ≤ x|y)
)
= E(θ|θ > x, S, n)PS(n|θ > x)− E(θ|θ ≤ x, S, y)PS(θ ≤ x|y)
= PS(θ ≤ x|y)
(
E(θ|θ > x, S, n)− E(θ|θ ≤ x, S, y)
)
≥ 0
Restricting attention to binary monotone partitions reduces the planner’s problem to the
choice of the cut-off, x. This choice is constrained by incentive compatibility; voters must be
willing to follow the recommendation they receive. That is, x must satisfy:
θ̂S(n) = E(θ|θ < x) ≤ v
θ̂S(y) = E(θ|θ > x) ≥ v
Since v ≥ 0, the first condition is satisfied for any x ∈ Θ. Since E(θ|θ > x) is increasing in
x, the second condition is satisfied by any x greater than some lower bound x:
x = min{x ∈ Θ : E(θ|θ > x) ≥ v}
Note that choosing x = v is essentially equivalent to giving voters perfect information, in the
sense that it leads them to vote as they would if they knew their valuation with certainty,
and therefore results in an identical distribution of outcomes.
To analyze the planner’s problem, it will be useful to express Ū as a function of the cut-off x.
All the probabilities in the expression for Ū given above depend on x, as does θ̂S(y). PS(N)
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is the probability that ≤ Q−1
2
out of Q agents vote y, and ρ(S) is the probability that exactly
Q−1
2
out of Q − 1 vote y. The number of y votes follows the binomial distribution, and the




θf(θ) dθ. Therefore Ū can be written in terms of x as follows (using the integral form


































2.2.3 Optimal Information Structures
Differentiating Ū(x) with respect to x and factoring out f(x), binomial coefficients, and
higher powers of F (x) and 1− F (x) gives the following first-order condition:






E(θ|θ > x) = 0
The positive term QvF (x) represents the benefit of the increase in P (N) when x increases,
whereas the negative term (for x > 0) xF (x) represents the change in the potential benefit
of making a pivotal y vote - as x rises, the range of values of θ for which an agent will vote






E(θ|θ > x) represents the impact on expected utility
of the effect a change in x has on the probability of the agent’s vote being pivotal (which is
maximised at F (x) = 1
2
).
Proposition 2. If there exists an x∗ ∈ [x, θ̄] that satisfies the first-order condition dŪ
dx
= 0,
then x∗ is the unique optimal choice of x for the planner. Otherwise the optimal choice is
x = θ̄ (no information).
Proof. As described above, dŪ
dx
= 0 requires:






E(θ|θ > x) = 0
When this holds, the sign of d
2Ū
dx2
is determined by the sign of the derivative of the left-hand-
side: (
Qv − x− (Q− 1)E(θ|θ > x)
)







Noting that for x ∈ [x, θ̄], F (x) > 0, the first-order condition implies that one of the following
must hold:
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• Qv − x∗ = 0 and F (x∗) = 1
2
• Qv − x∗ > 0 and F (x∗) > 1
2
• Qv − x∗ < 0 and F (x∗) < 1
2
In each case the derivative above is strictly negative. In the first case, it is equal to:
−(Q− 1)E(θ|θ > x∗))f(x∗)− F (x∗)
In the second case, all terms in the derivative are negative, since the first-order condition
implies that: (
Qv − x∗ − (Q− 1)E(θ|θ > x∗)
)
< 0




E(θ|θ > x)− x
1− F (x)
Substituting this expression into the derivative above and rearranging gives:
(
Q(v − x)− (Q− 1)
2
(





All terms are negative for x > v.
It follows that if dŪ
dx
= 0 holds at x∗, d
2Ū
dx2
< 0 also holds at x∗, and Ū(x) has no interior





P (N |x) + ρ(x)(1− F (x)
)
< v
It follows that if there is no x∗ ∈ [x, θ̄] that satisfies the first-order condition, Ū(x) is increasing
over the interval and maximised at x = θ̄.
If the optimal choice is x = θ̄, the planner chooses an information structure that always
results in outcome N winning! This implies that the benefits to total welfare of eliciting
information about agent preferences through a vote are always outweighed by the effect of
‘tyranny of the majority’ outcomes, and the planner chooses an information structure that
makes the vote redundant. The next result demonstrates that this occurs if θ̄ is too close to
v, which means that the potential benefits of outcome Y to y voters are limited; the planner
would like to ensure that only those who prefer Y by enough of a margin vote y, but if the
upper bound on θ is low enough there are no such voters.
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Proposition 3. The optimal choice for the planner is x = θ̄ if and only if the following
condition holds:












E(θ|θ > x) = Q(v − Q+1
2Q
θ̄)
While x = θ̄ offers the least informative solution possible, the other extreme is found at
x = v, which leads to no ‘mistakes’ in voting. This structure gives identical outcomes to
the case in which voters are perfectly informed about their valuation, so if x = v is optimal,
perfect information is optimal.
The clearest way in which this can be the case is when v is equal to both the mean and the
median of the distribution of θ. That is, v = 0 and F (v) = 1
2
. In this case the first-order
condition holds at x = v. Since v = 0, agents have no preference for N in expectation, so
there is no ex ante benefit in increasing the probability that N is selected, and since F (v) = 1
2
the choice of x = v also maximises each agent’s probability of being pivotal. Agents therefore
have no incentive to accept any chance of making a mistake in the event that they are pivotal.
This is not the only case in which perfect information may be optimal. In fact, it is a special
case of a general necessary and sufficient condition, which is that the expected values of θ
conditional on being greater than or less than v be symmetric.
Proposition 4. The optimal choice for the planner is x = v if and only if the following
condition holds:
E(θ|θ ≥ v)− v = v − E(θ|θ < v)
That is, there exists a ∈ R+ such that:
E(θ|θ ≥ v) = v + a
E(θ|θ < v) = v − a












E(θ|θ ≥ v)− v
)
As E(θ) = 0, applying the law of total expectation gives:







E(θ|θ ≥ v)− E(θ|θ < v)
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Setting the two expressions for F (v) equal and rearranging gives the condition stated in the
proposition.
This condition for perfect information to be optimal equates the average benefit to y voters
(under perfect information) of Y winning to the average benefit to n voters of N winning.
Proposition 5 shows that this balance is what the optimal information structure converges
to achieve as Q rises, where possible, This is only possible if v ≤ θ̄
2
. Otherwise once Q is
sufficiently large, no information becomes optimal, per Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. If v ≤ θ̄
2
, then as Q → ∞, x∗ → x̂ monotonically, where x̂ is the unique
value in Θ such that:
E(θ|θ ≥ x̂)− v = v − E(θ|θ < x̂)
Otherwise there exists a Q̂ such that for Q ≥ Q̂, x∗ = θ̄.
Proof. If v = x̂, then by Proposition 4, x∗ = v = x̂ for any Q and the proposition follows
trivially. Otherwise, the first-order condition can be rewritten as follows:
Q− 1 = x− v
vF (x) + (1
2
− F (x))E(θ|θ > x)
F (x)
Using the fact that F (x) = E(θ|θ>x)
E(θ|θ>x)−E(θ|θ<x) , this can be further rewritten as:
Q− 1 = 2(x− v)(




E(θ|θ > x)− v
)
The denominator of the right-hand side is clearly decreasing in x and equal to 0 at x = x̂.
Since Q− 1 is positive, this allows two possibilities for x∗:
• x∗ > v and x∗ < x̂.
• x∗ < v and x∗ > x̂.
It follows that if v < x̂, then v < x∗ < x̂ for all Q. Alternatively, if v > x̂, then x̂ < x∗ < v
for all Q.
In the first case, the right-hand side fraction is increasing in x, while in the second case it is
decreasing. It follows that, in the first case, for any x′ ∈ (v, x̂) there exists a Q̄ such that:
Q̄− 1 > 2(x
′ − v)(




E(θ|θ > x′)− v
)
Therefore for all Q > Q̄, x̂ > x∗ > x′, and it follows that x∗ converges to x̂ as Q goes to
infinity. A symmetric argument applies in the second case.
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2.2.4 Alternative majority thresholds
The results of the previous section generalise to votes that use a threshold other than simple
majority rule. Consider a voting rule under which outcome Y is implemented if and only if
the number of y votes is greater than k ≤ Q. The simple majority is given by k = Q−1
2
. The
optimality of binary monotone partitions is unchanged in this case, and the expected utility























As before, a simplified first-order condition for an optimal internal solution can be derived:
(Qv − x)F (x) + (Q− 1)
(
Q−k−1
Q−1 − F (x)
)
E(θ|θ > x) = 0
Corresponding results to those of the previous section follow. In particular, perfect informa-
tion is optimal if and only if:
k
(
E(θ|θ > v)− v
)
= (Q− k − 1)
(
v − E(θ|θ < v)
)
This is simply a weighted version of the condition in the simple majority case, in which
k = Q − k − 1. It equalises the expected impacts of implementing outcome Y over N on
yes voters and no voters weighted by the proportion of each type in the population when a
deciding vote is cast.
In considering the limit information structure as Q becomes large, it is appropriate to treat
the rule as requiring y votes greater than a fixed fraction cQ, c ∈ (0, 1). Then for each Q, k is
the largest integer that does not exceed cQ. Proposition 6 demonstrates that the convergence
result for simple majority rule generalises; the optimal threshold x converges to a point at
which the expected benefits to each type of voter are balanced when weighted according to
the proportions of each type present in the population when the vote is exactly balanced.
As in the simple majority case, when perfect information is not optimal because it does not
appropriately balance the expected impacts, then as Q becomes large, x∗ approaches the
point which does achieve that balance (if this point exists; as before, it depends on v not
being too close to θ̄).
Proposition 6. If for each Q the voting threshold k is the largest integer less than cQ,
c ∈ (0, 1), and v ≤ cθ̄, then as Q→∞, x∗ → x̂c monotonically, where x̂c is the unique value
in Θ such that:
c
(




v − E(θ|θ < x̂c)
)
If v > cθ̄, then there exists a Q̂ such that for Q ≥ Q̂, x∗ = θ̄.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.
61
2.3 Abstention
The results of the previous section show that with mandatory voting, the inefficiencies of
the voting system can be somewhat mitigated by restricting voter information if and only if
the distribution of valuations is asymmetric in the sense given by Proposition 4. However,
inefficiencies are still present even if this asymmetry is not (that is, if x∗ = v). The proposition
only implies that in such cases, restricting voter information cannot help. The benefits
of restricting information with mandatory voting come from causing either y or n voters
(crucially, not both) who are relatively close to being indifferent to vote ‘incorrectly’. If the
expected impacts of the policy on y and n voters are already exactly balanced when those
voters are perfectly informed, this does not help, since the benefits in terms of increasing
the probability that one outcome happens ‘when it should’ (i.e. when it maximises total
utility given the true valuations) are exactly cancelled out by the losses from the increased
probability of that outcome happening when it should not.
If the assumption of mandatory voting is relaxed, then it is possible to have relatively-
indifferent voters abstain from voting, rather than relying on them voting incorrectly. In this
case, the planner may benefit by restricting information even when the distribution of valu-
ations is symmetric. To demonstrate this, in this section I make the following modifications
to the model:
• Voters’ action set is {y, n, b}.
• The vote is conducted by comparing the numbers of y and n votes. b votes are ignored.
• Voters who are indifferent between outcomes choose b.
• v = 0.
• θ is distributed symmetrically around 0; that is, θ = −θ̄ and f(θ) = f(−θ).
• Ties are now possible and are broken by 50-50 randomization.
The model is otherwise identical to the previous section. Assuming symmetry simplifies the
discussion while focusing on a case in which perfect information is optimal under mandatory
voting. Note that whether or not symmetry is assumed, the introduction of abstentions makes
the planner more powerful; it does not significantly restrict what she can achieve compared
to mandatory voting. Binary monotone partitions with a cut-off in (x, θ̄] result in the same
outcomes as before, since their messages never leave voters indifferent. The effect of a binary
monotone partition with cut-off x does change, but the proof of Proposition 2 demonstrates
that this information structure is never optimal for the planner under mandatory voting.
I denote the ex ante expected utility of an agent given this modified setting and a signal
structure S by Ūa(S). Note that since incentive compatibility requires that E(θ|a = b) = 0,
Ūa(S) can be expressed similarly to Ū(S) :
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Ūa(S) = ρ(S)PS(y)θ̂S(y)
Since there are now three possible actions, the planner may now choose to use three-message
information structures, with the caveat that one message must induce abstention (θ̂S = 0):
Proposition 7. Let S = {M, g} be a signal structure, with |M | > 3. Then there exists a
signal structure S ′ = {M ′, g′} such that M ′ = {y, n, b}, Ūa(S ′) = Ūa(S)
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as that of Proposition 1, except that messages in
M that result in indifference (i.e. θ̂S(m) = 0) result in abstention (action b) rather than
randomization and are mapped to a distinct b message in M ′, with θ̂S′(b) = 0.
Define a three-message symmetric monotone partition as a signal structure S = (M, g)
with M = {y, n, b}, for which there exists a γ ∈ [0, 1] such that:
g(n|θ) =
{








1 θ ≥ x
0 otherwise
Note that given E(θ) = 0 and the symmetry of the distribution of θ, this implies that
θ̂S(b) = 0, that θ̂(n) = −θ̂(y), and that:
PS(y) = PS(n) =
1− PS(b)
2
The next set of results show that attention can be restricted to three-message symmetric
monotone partitions, as some such signal structure is always weakly optimal among three-
message structures.
Lemma 2. For a fixed PS(b), the probability that a given y vote is pivotal, ρ(S), is maximised
at PS(y) = PS(n).






where TS(k) gives the probability that the voter is pivotal and that exactly k of the other
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Lemma 2 demonstrates the intuitive conclusion that the probability of a given vote being
pivotal is maximised when the probability of y and n votes are equal, as this maximises the
probability of a tie or near-tie among the other non-abstaining voters.
The next result shows that signal structures can be improved upon by ‘unmixing’ the two
vote-inducing messages, while leaving the abstention-inducing message untouched.
Lemma 3. For any signal structure S =
{
{y, n, b}, G
}
with:
θ̂S(y) ≥ θ̂S(b) = 0 ≥ θ̂S(n)
there exists a signal structure S ′ =
{
{y, n, b}, G′
}
and a cut-off x ∈ Θ such that:
• PS′(y) = PS(y), PS′(b) = PS(b), and PS′(n) = PS(n)
• θ̂S′(y) ≥ θ̂S′(b) = 0 ≥ θ̂S′(n)
• PS′(y|θ < x) = PS′(n|θ ≥ x) = 0
• Ūa(S ′) ≥ Ūa(S)
Proof. Begin by choosing x to solve the following equation:
PS(y) = PS(θ ≥ x,m 6= b)
A solution exists in Θ as the right hand side is continuous, weakly decreasing in x, equal to
PS(h) + PS(l) at x = θ, and equal to 0 at x = θ̄. Now construct g
′ as follows:
g′(b|θ) = g(b|θ)
4To understand the derivation of this expression, note that the probability of making a pivotal y vote is
PS(Y |y) − PS(Y |n). When the number of other voters is odd, switching from n to y can impact P (Y ) by
causing a tie (N ahead by one vote among the other voters) or by breaking one (Y ahead by one vote among








0 θ < x
g(n) + g(y) otherwise
It is straightforward to check that g′ fulfills the conditions on PS′(y) and PS′(n) given in the
statement of the proposition. Since the probabilities of each action under S are preserved
by S ′, ρ(S ′) = ρ(S). It follows that to prove Ūa(S
′) ≥ Ūa(S), it is sufficient to show that
θ̂S′(y) ≥ θ̂S(y). Note that θ̂S′(y) = E(θ|S, θ ≥ x,m 6= z). Given this, θ̂S′(y) ≥ θ̂S(y) can be
shown using the same method as in the proof of Lemma 1.
Once the vote-inducing signals have been ‘unmixed’ in this way, the next result shows that
when abstentions occur, it should be the most ambivalent voters who abstain. That is, the
abstention-inducing message should be sent if and only if valuations fall into an interval that
is symmetrical around 0.
Lemma 4. For any signal structure S =
{
{y, n, b}, G
}
and cut-off x with:
θ̂S(y) ≥ θ̂S(b) = 0 ≥ θ̂S(n)
and:
PS(y|θ < x) = PS(n|θ ≥ x) = 0
there exists a signal structure S ′ =
{
{y, n, b}, G′
}
and cut-off γ ≥ 0 such that:
• θ̂S′(y) ≥ θ̂S′(b) = 0 ≥ θ̂S′(n)
• PS′(y|θ < x) = PS′(n|θ ≥ x) = 0
• PS′(b) = PS(b)
• PS′(b|θ ∈ [−γ, γ]) = 1 and PS′(b|θ /∈ [−γ, γ] = 0
• θ̂S′(y)PS′(y) ≥ θ̂S(y)PS(y)
Proof. Begin by choosing γ to solve:
F (γ)− F (−γ) = PS(b)
Now construct g′ as follows:
g′(b|θ) =
{









1 θ > x, θ /∈ [−γ, γ]
0 otherwise
To see that θ̂S′(y)PS′(y) ≥ θ̂S(y)PS(y), note that:
θ̂S′(y)PS′(y)− θ̂S(y)P (y) = (1− F (x))
(
E(θ|S, θ > x, b)PS(b|θ > x)
− E(θ|S ′, θ > x, b)PS′(b|θ > x)
)
Assume that:
E(θ|S ′, θ > x, b)PS′(b|θ > x) > E(θ|S, θ > x, b)PS(b|θ > x)
This implies γ > x, since otherwise PS′(b|θ > x) = 0. Given that, note that among all subsets
Z of [x, θ̄] with P (θ ∈ Z|θ > x) = PS′(b|θ > x), the interval [x, γ] minimizes E(θ|θ ∈ Z),
which implies that E(θ|S ′, θ > x, b) ≤ E(θ|S ′, θ > x, b). Therefore, for the assumption to
hold it must be the case that:
PS′(b|θ > x) > PS(b|θ > x)
Applying the law of total expectation to the original assumption gives:
E(θ|S, θ > x, b)PS(b|θ < x) > E(θ|S ′, θ < x, b)PS′(b|θ < x)
However, it is also the case that among all subsets Z of [θ, x] with P (θ ∈ Z|θ > x) = PS′(b|θ <
x), [−γ, x] maximizes E(θ|θ ∈ Z), which (given that the expectations in the inequality above
are negative) implies that:
PS′(b|θ < x) > PS(b|θ < x)
This implies that PS′(b) > PS(b), which is a contradiction. It follows that
E(θ|S ′, θ > x, b)PS′(b|θ > x) ≤ E(θ|S, θ > x, b)PS(b|θ > x)
and therefore θ̂S′(y)PS′(y) ≥ θ̂S(y)P (y).
Finally, combining the preceding results shows that symmetric monotone partitions are
weakly optimal.
Proposition 8. For any signal structure S =
{
{y, n, b}, G
}
with:
θ̂S(y) ≥ θ̂S(b) = 0 ≥ θ̂S(n)
there exists a signal structure S ′ =
{
{y, n, b}, G′
}
such that S ′ is a three-message symmetric
monotone partition and Ūa(S
′) ≥ Ūa(S).
Proof. Begin by constructing an intermediate signal structure S ′′ =
{
{y, n, b}, g′′
}
using the
steps given in the proofs of Lemma 3 and 4, resulting in a structure with cut-offs x and γ
such that b is sent if −γ ≤ θ ≤ γ, n is sent if θ < min{x,−γ}, and y is sent if θ > max{x, γ}.
Per the preceding proofs, this construction also gives:
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• PS′′(b) = PS(b)
• ˆθ(y)S′′PS′′(y) ≥ ˆθ(y)SPS(y)
Now construct g′ as follows:
g′(b|θ) =
{








1 θ > γ
0 otherwise
This construction gives PS(y) = PS(n). By Lemma 2, it follows that the ρ(S
′) ≥ ρ(S)
(since both S and S ′ induce the same abstention probability, PS′(b) = PS(b)). To see that
θ̂S′(y)PS′(y) ≥ θ̂S(y)PS(y), note that if x < −γ:
θ̂S′(y)PS′(y)− θ̂S(y)PS(y) = −E(θ|x < θ ≤ −γ)P (x < θ ≤ −γ)
If x > γ, then:
θ̂S′(y)PS′(y)− θ̂S(y)PS(y) = E(θ|γ ≤ θ < x)P (γ ≤ θ < x)
Finally, if x ∈ [−γ, γ] then:
θ̂S′(y)PS′(y) = θ̂S(y)P (y)
Restricting attention to symmetric monotone partitions reduces the problem, once again, to
the choice of a single variable, γ. If S is a symmetric monotone partition, Ūa(S) can be
written as Ūa(γ). This leads to the central result of this section; that with symmetry and
abstentions, for a sufficiently large number of voters, giving voters perfect information is
never optimal.













Clearly the second term is 0 at γ = 0, so it it sufficient to show that dρ
dγ
is positive at γ = 0.





















h(Q, k)(1− F (γ))Q−1−k(2F (γ)− 1)k
Each term in the summation gives the probability that k of the other voters abstain, and
that the vote among the remaining n− k− 1 voters is tied (for n− k− 1 even) or leaves one














2k(1− F (γ))Q−1−k(2F (γ)− 1)k−1
− (Q− 1− k)(1− F (γ))Q−2−k(2F (γ)− 1)k
]
At γ = 0, F (γ) = 1
2
and all but two terms are 0. For even Q, h(Q, 1) = Q
2
h(Q, 0), which,












For odd Q, h(Q, 1) = Q−1
2
h(Q, 0), which gives dρ(0)
dγ
= 0, and consequently dUa(0)
dγ
= 0.






































(Q− 1)E(θ|θ > 0)f(0)
∫ θ̄
0





The model developed in this paper demonstrates that a utilitarian social planner may not
want voters to be perfectly informed about how the possible outcomes of a vote will affect
them. Of course, in reality, it will often be more of a concern that voters are too poorly
informed. The results given here simply sound a note of caution about the problems (from
a utilitarian perspective) with the voting mechanism itself, and how information that is
excessively precise may exacerbate those problems by allowing those who are minimally
impacted by the voting outcome to have a disproportionate effect on it (and, with abstention,
by encouraging them to vote in the first place!).
I have largely abstracted away from the possibility of common values among the voters in
this model, though it is possible to interpret it as taking place after a common value element
has been ‘parceled out’ and publicly signaled, determining the value of the parameter v.
When the effect of information on voter valuations is likely to be highly correlated across
voters, it will typically be beneficial to signal that information accurately. As described in the
introduction, this model pertains to information that may result in a wide range of valuations
for any given voter, depending on their preferences. It is worth noting that the ‘voters’ in
this model can be interpreted as equally-sized groups of individual voters, each group having
its own shared set of preferences. A possible extension of the model along these lines would
add weights to each voter, in both the planner’s objective and the voting mechanism itself.
Another direction for future work is to consider non-binary votes. Once there are more than
two outcomes, strategic voting enters the picture. The possible effects of the information
structure on voters’ incentives to vote strategically, and the resulting impacts on welfare,
make for a promising line of inquiry.
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Chapter 3
Information Sharing in Continuous
Two-Player Games
3.1 Introduction
Agents engaged in strategic interactions will often have preferences over what their opponents
believe about them, since this will influence equilibirum play. One way in which agents can
affect those beliefs is to reveal, hide, or partially reveal private information to which they
have access. In this paper, I consider two-player games in which each player can select the
information structure through which their opponent learns about the player’s own payoff
type, but has to commit to this choice before learning their own payoffs. One can think of
this as the agent making a choice about how ‘public’ the investigative process through which
they learn their own payoffs is.
This structure has a precedent in the extensive literature on information sharing in oligopoly,
which goes back to Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982). In these models, firms engaged in
oligopolistic competition make a commitment ahead of time to reveal or conceal information
about market demand or private costs (the decision is typically considered to be implemented
through trade associations). Whether firms reveal or conceal information depends on the
information in question and the structure of the underlying game (Cournot versus Bertrand
competition, complements versus substitutes). I review this and other related literature in
Section 3.1.1 below.
The model I present allows for a greater range of information structures than in the in-
formation sharing literature, which assumes either a binary choice between revelation and
concealment, or allows for the addition of unbiased noise (by having the agents choose the
variance of an error term in a signal, or choose the proportion of private signals to be added
to a public pool). I consider the possibility that agents can engage in ‘persuasion’ of their
opponent, in the sense of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In line with that paper and the in-
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formation design literature that follows it, I allow agents to choose a stochastic mapping from
their possible payoff types to messages that may be sent to their opponents. To see how this
allows for possibilities not encompassed by adding noise, consider a Cournot duopolist who
may have high or low costs. Considering ‘persuasive’ information structures allows for the
duopolist adopting asymmetric information structures, with signaling behavior that varies
dependent on the realised costs; for example, a structure that sends a ‘low’ message whenever
the firm realises low costs, but mixes between ‘low’ and ‘high’ messages whenever it realises
high costs.
The model consists of a two-stage simultaneous-move game with two players. Payoffs are
initially uncertain, with each player’s payoff type to be drawn from a set of two possibilities
according to a common prior. In the first stage, each player simultaneously chooses and
commits to an information structure. Players then observe the other player’s first-stage
choice, learn their own payoff type with certainty, and receive a signal about the payoff type
of their opponent generated by the information structure their opponent chose in the first
stage. In the second stage, the players engage in a simultaneous game in which the action
space is an interval, with payoffs determined by the second-stage actions and the payoff
types. So in the Cournot example, each firm learns their own cost with certainty before
choosing output (but after choosing an information structure), and what they learn about
their opponent’s cost depends on the information structure that their opponent chose in the
first stage.
In the first stage of this game, the players act as information designers, but interacting
ones. The information design problem each player faces in determining their first-stage best
response is shaped by the strategy of their opponent, because the players care about the
second-stage interaction between the receivers they are each transmitting information to
(their respective opponent’s second-stage selves). The model is therefore a special case of
interactive information design as described in Koessler, Laclau and Tomala (2020), which
analyzes the general case of interacting designers who care about the outcome of a game
played among a number of receivers. That paper is primarily concerned with the existence
of equilibrium. As the authors point out, single-sender information design tends to use
a sender’s-preferred-outcome tie-breaking rule to assure the existence of a solution to the
sender’s problem. This does not transfer to the case of multiple senders, and the possibility
of sender expected payoffs that are discontinuous in the posterior beliefs of receivers raises a
question as to equilibrium existence in the first stage. Koessler et al. give an existence proof
that relies on the presence of a correlating device, essentially requiring that the players be
allowed to play correlated equilibria in the second stage.
For the model of this paper, I provide sufficient conditions on payoffs to guarantee existence
without a correlating device. These conditions are a stronger version of standard conditions
that guarantee equilibrium uniqueness in the second stage for any given posterior beliefs, and
they encompass a large class of concave games, including typical quadratic forms of Cournot
and Bertrand oligopoly games. They additionally guarantee the existence of Markovian
equilibria; I adopt this terminology from Koessler et al. (2020) to describe equilibria in
which players’ second-stage strategies are conditioned only on their posterior beliefs about
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the state of the world (in this case, their knowledge of their own payoff type and their beliefs
about their opponent’s type) and do not otherwise depend on the first-stage choices.
Markovian equilibria are of particular interest because they allow analysis of a player’s first-
stage problem using the tools of the information design literature. Given Markovian second-
stage strategies and a first-stage strategy for one player, the second player’s expected payoff
can be written as a function of the first player’s posterior belief, which I refer to as the player’s
ex-ante value function. This gives the expected payoff of the second player conditional on the
first player receiving information that induces a given posterior belief. The concave closure of
the ex-ante value function then determines the second player’s best response, per Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011), and analysis of the function and its convexity properties can reveal
whether particular forms of payoff uncertainty and the resulting second-stage games lead to
revelation, concealment, or other behavior in the first stage, and why.
I demonstrate that the derivatives of this first-stage value function can be split into two
distinct effects, which represent two different impacts on the conditional expected payoff of
a player of a shift in their opponent’s posterior belief. One effect arises straightforwardly
from the change in expected second-stage play; any change in the beliefs of either player
typically leads to changes in the equilibrium second-stage actions of both players. I call this
the equilibrium-action effect. The other effect is due to the ex ante implications for a player’s
own expected preferences of a shift in the opponent’s posterior. Since the players observe
the information structures chosen by their opponent and update their beliefs rationally, an
increase in an opponent’s posterior belief that a player has a particular payoff type implies
an increase in the probability that the player does have that payoff type, conditional on the
opponent’s posterior. I call this the own-type effect.
Returning to the Cournot example will help to clarify the role of these effects. An increase
in one player’s posterior belief that the other has a low cost of production leads to reduced
equilibrium production for the former player and corresponding increased equilibrium pro-
duction (and an increased expected payoff) for the latter. This is the expected-action effect.
The only way for the latter player to bring about such a change in the posterior that will
result from a given message is to increase the probability that the message is sent when they
do have low costs, or to decrease the probability that it is sent when they in fact have high
costs - effectively, to increase the probability that they have low costs conditional on that
message being sent. Because they produce more when their costs are low, their expected
payoff conditional on the message being sent consequently rises. This is the own-type effect.
To demonstrate how this approach can shed light on particular applications, I analyze a
variety of games with quadratic payoffs, which allow for explict derivation of the equilibrium
second-stage actions. For a certain class of games which encompasses the case of Cournot
oligopoly with linear cost uncertainty as described above (for both substitute and complemen-
tary goods), I show that both effects are always positive. This guarantees a convex ex-ante
value function, and consequently full revelation of types as a dominant-strategy equilibrium.
This result is in line with the information sharing literature, and shows that the finding of
full revelation of cost information under Cournot competition and linear marginal costs is
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robust to allowing for persuasive information structures. Additionally, it clarifies the struc-
tural features underlying those results. The expected benefit a firm in Cournot competition
derives from an increase in an opponent’s belief that the firm has low costs is increasing
in that belief, because it is proportional to the firm’s own expected production level, and
that production level is decreasing in the firm’s expected costs (own-type effect) and in the
opponent’s expected production level (equilibrium-action effect). Since the expected benefit
is increasing, it is optimal for the firm to ‘gamble’ by choosing an information structure that
mixes between extreme posterior beliefs for its opponent - that is, a revealing information
structure.
The approach I use also clarifies why contrasting results of full concealment have been found
for differentiated Bertrand competition. I show that the key structural difference that leads to
concealment of costs in Bertrand competition versus revelation under Cournot is the presence
of an ‘externality’ in Bertrand competition; that is, a component of each player’s payoff that
is determined by their opponent’s action independently of the player’s own action. This
externality is the impact on a player’s total costs of production of their opponent’s choice of
price (through its effect on demand), holding the player’s own price fixed. This varies with
marginal cost and enters into the own-type effect, changing its sign and reversing optimal
first-stage behavior. In Bertrand competition with substitute goods, for example, a player
benefits from an increase in their opponent’s belief that the player has high costs, as this
leads the opponent to expect a higher price from the first player and to raise their own price
accordingly. However, this benefit is decreasing in the probability that the player actually
has high costs - there is an increasing component as their own equilibrium price rises, but
this is outweighed by the falling benefit of increased demand due to rising expected marginal
cost.
In addition to providing insight into these well-treated cases, I consider several further classes
of games that demonstrate how first-stage behavior in other settings may not be as straight-
forward. In Cournot competition with quadratic costs, when the uncertainty is only over
the scale of the cost function (i.e. there is one type draw for which the linear and quadratic
coefficients of the cost function are both larger than for the other possible type), the linear
result generalises and full revelation still obtains. However, I show that if the uncertainty
is between cost functions in which one has a larger linear coefficient and the other a larger
quadratic component (i.e. the marginal cost functions cross), then cost information may
be concealed rather than revealed, as a result of equilibrium production choices that vary
nonlinearly in beliefs.
I also consider alternative forms of uncertainty that serve to demonstrate that the dominant-
strategy, fully-revealing or fully-concealing outcomes of the settings described above should
not be expected in general. I consider a class of games for which the initial uncertainty
is over the cross-effect - for each player, there is a possibility that the opponent’s action
is a strategic complement and an alternative possibility that it is a strategic substitute. I
show that for some range of priors this leads to fully-revealing behaviour, and for another
to fully-concealing behaviour, but there is also an intermediate range for which multiple
equilibria exist. When the prior falls in this latter range, revelation is the best response
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to revelation, but concealment is the best response to concealment, and there also exists a
third symmetric equilibrium in which both players choose a partially-revealing information
structure. This demonstrates that unique and continuously-related equilibria in the second-
stage games do not guarantee uniqueness in the overall game, and that ‘persuasive’ play is
possible in equilibrium.
Section 3.2 introduces the model by working through a basic example: Cournot duopoly
with homogeneous goods and uncertainty over linear costs. Section 3.3 develops the general
model, including a set of sufficient conditions on payoffs for equilibrium existence, and the
general form of the ex-ante value function and its second derivative (broken down into the
expected-action and own-type effects). Section 3.4 analyzes various forms of uncertainty
for games with quadratic payoffs, identifying classes of games with fully-revealing and fully-
concealing outcomes which encompass the oligopoly games with cost uncertainty considered
in the information sharing literature, and considering games with cross-effect uncertainty for
which the outcomes are less straightforward and may include partially-revealing information
structures.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on information design. Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) give a general analysis of information design or persuasion in the single-sender, single-
receiver case, using the ‘concavification’ approach I adopt in this paper (which was also
used in the context of repeated games in Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1995) and the
related literature). Bergemann and Morris (2016), Taneva (2019), Mathevet, Perogo and
Taneva (2020) and others extend the analysis to settings with multiple, interacting receivers1.
Bergemann and Morris (2019) and Kamenica (2019) review many of the varying settings
considered in the literature.
The literature on information design settings with multiple senders is less extensive. Gentzkow
and Kamenica (2016, 2017) and Li and Norman (2018) consider multiple senders with access
to the same information about a singular state of the world face a single receiver, and focus
on the conditions under which moving from single to multiple senders makes the receiver
more informed. Albrecht (2017), Au and Kawai (2019) and Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015)
all analyze particular settings in which multiple senders with information about different
things (i.e. different components of the overall state of the world, as in this paper), all with
a single receiver. Koessler, Laclau, Renault and Tomala (2019) consider two senders and
a single receiver in the context of a multistage game. As described above, Koessler et al.
(2020) consider a general multi-sender, multi-receiver game, of which the model of this paper
is a particular case.
Two papers connect this literature to models of information sharing in oligopoly games, which
1Although the model of this paper includes multiple receivers, the information design problem is essen-
tially a single-receiver one, since each sender is choosing the information structure for a single receiver (their
opponent).
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provide many of the examples I consider here. Bergemann and Morris (2013) show that the
result of Clarke (1983) that firms will not share demand information in Cournot competition
with homogeneous goods is not robust to allowing for a full range of possible information
structures. Their work is distinct from this paper both in that they consider ‘public value’
demand information, whereas I focus on private values (typically cost information in an
oligopoly interpretation), and in that they use information structures that go beyond the
scope of what I allow - their optimal information structure sometimes aggregates the private
information of the firms to produce a noisy signal for each firm. In my model the information
a firm receives can only be conditioned on the type draw of the other firm, not on the
combination of types.
Vaissman Guinsburg (2020) develops a model closely related to my example of Cournot
competition with uncertainty over linear costs. The main difference is that I assume that firms
observe their own types, whereas Vaissman Guinsburg assumes that they receive only the
information that their chosen information structure generates for their opponent, so that the
only way to conceal information from the opponent is for the player not to learn it themselves
(or, equivalently, the only way to learn about one’s own costs is to reveal that information
to the opponent). The basic result in both cases is full revelation2. Vaissman Guinsburg also
shows that the full revelation result does not apply when second-stage equilibrium actions
are not interior (i.e. when there is a range of posterior beliefs at which a firm will shut down
production). This is also the case in my model, though I do not deal with that scenario in
this paper and generally assume interior second-stage actions.
Information sharing in oligopoly is another broad corpus of literature, building on the early
work of Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Vives (1984), and Fried (1984). Raith (1996)
summarises much of the prior literature and draws it together under a general model. As
my model is concerned with private values, it is most closely connected to those papers
that consider sharing of cost information. Fried (1984) gives a full-revelation result for cost
information in Cournot competition with homogenous goods, which is the setting I develop as
an example in Section 3.2. Gal-Or (1986) extends the Cournot result to differentiated goods,
and shows that the opposite outcome of full concealment of costs results under Bertrand
competition. Amir, Jin, and Troege (2010) generalise the earlier results of revelation under
Cournot and concealment under Bertrand by dropping distributional assumptions made in
earlier papers.
As well as uncertainty over the coefficients on a firm’s own action (which includes private cost
uncertainty under an oligopoly interpretation), I consider uncertainty over the cross-effect
between a player’s action and their opponent’s. To my knowledge there is little work that
considers information sharing when the information pertains to the cross-effect. Chokler,
Hon-Snir, Kim and Shitovitz (2006) analyze a Cournot setting with cross-effect uncertainty,
and consider which firm benefits when one firm is fully informed and the other uninformed,
2Vaissman Guinsburg suggests that this results from a trade-off between concealing information from
the opponent and not having access to it for oneself - however, since full revelation is also the result in the
Cournot game in this paper, and in the earlier information sharing literature, it seems that this trade-off
does not drive the revelation result.
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with the result turning on whether the cross-effect is common or private value. Xu (2010) does
consider an information sharing choice with cross-effect uncertainty, rising from an uncertain
slope of the demand function in a Cournot setting, which then enters into the cross-effect.
This is a constrained case3, and also differs from my model in that the uncertain parameter
is common value, whereas I restrict attention to private values.
3.2 An example: Cournot with cost uncertainty
I begin by considering a classic Cournot duopoly with homogenous goods. The result, that
firms reveal their cost information as a dominant strategy, is in line with Fried (1984) and the
related literature and not striking in itself. Unlike that literature, firms here will have access
to ‘persuasive’ information structures, but I will show that they will not choose to use them.
However, developing this concrete and relatively straightforward example demonstrates and
helps to clarify the analytical approach and structural features of the general model, which
I set out in the next section.
Assume that firms simultaneously choose their production quantity qi, have a constant
marginal cost ci, and face a market price given by the following inverse demand function:
p = 1− qi − qj
Firm payoffs are then given by:
ui(qi, qj, ci) = (1− ci)qi − qiqj − q2i




latter assumption ensures that firms do choose non-zero quantities). The firms’ costs are
drawn i.i.d. and there is a common prior, P (cl) = µ̂. The firms play a two-stage game with
the following timing, acting to maximise their expected payoffs:
1. Each firm simultaneously commits to and announces a signal structure, a stochastic
mapping from realisations of its own cost into messages sent to the other firm.
2. Costs are drawn. Each firm observes its own draw, a message about the cost of the
other firm generated by the other firm’s chosen signal structure, and the message sent
from its own signal structure to the other firm. Firms update their beliefs about the
cost of the other firm according to Bayes’ rule.
3. Firms simultaneously choose quantities and receive their payoffs.
3Constrained in that it imposes a specific relationship between the value of the cross-effect and the value
of the coefficient on the square of a player’s own action.
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I will describe the choice of signal structure in more detail shortly, but it will be useful to
begin with the final step, the second stage of the game in which firms choose quantities. At
this point, firms know their own cost and have some posterior belief about their opponent’s
cost, P (cj = cl) = µi. They also know their opponent’s posterior about their own cost, µj.










ui(qi, qj(µj, µi, cj), ci)
)





So firm i’s best-response is given by:
qi(µi, µj, ci) =





Substituting and solving gives the equilibrium second-stage quantities as functions of the two
firm’s posterior expectations about each other’s costs:
q∗i (µi, µj, ci) =
2− 3ci + 2Eµi(cj)− Eµj(ci)
6
Denote by vi(µi, µj, ci) the interim expected payoff of firm i when its realised cost is ci and
the posteriors are µi and µj, given that the firms will play the equilibrium second-stage
strategies:




i (µi, µj, ci), q
∗
j (µj, µi, cj), ci)
)
I now turn to the choice of signal structure. A signal structure is a set of messages and
a stochastic mapping that for each cost and message gives the probability that the given
message is sent conditional on the given cost being realised. From a firm’s point of view, all
that matters in the choice of signal structure is the distribution of second-stage payoffs it
induces. Second-stage outcomes are determined by the two posterior beliefs and the firm’s
own cost draw. Note the following:
• The distribution of firm i’s own posterior belief µi is entirely determined by the oppo-
nent’s strategy and is independent of the firm’s own choice of signal structure.
• Given that firm j is a rational Bayesian and understands firm i’s chosen signal structure,
the distribution of ci conditional on firm j receiving a given message is one and the
same as firm j’s posterior belief after receiving that message. That is, if firm i chooses a
structure containing a message that results in firm j assigning probability 3
4
to ci = cl,
then it must be the case from firm i’s ex ante point of view that the probability of
having low costs when that message is sent is 3
4
.
Given the above, specifying a posterior belief for firm j fully determines the resulting distri-
bution of second-stage outcomes (holding constant firm j’s own choice of signal structure).
78
This means that it is without loss to identify messages with the posterior belief µj that they
induce and, following Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), firm i’s choice of signal structure can
be seen as choosing a distribution τi over firm j’s posterior µj, subject only to the condition
that the distribution be ‘Bayes-plausible’:
Eτi(µj) = µ̂
Any given µj has an ex ante value to firm i, given the opponent’s signal structure τj: firm
i’s expected payoff conditional on firm j having received a message that induced µj. Denote
this value by Vi(µj; τj):






Note that µj plays a dual role in this expression. It factors into the function ui(µi, µj, ci) as
the opponent’s posterior, determining firm j’s expected action. However, when it appears in
the expectation operator Eµj , it is acting as the conditional distribution on ci.
The core insight of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) is that once a value is assigned to a
receiver’s posterior belief in this way, the sender’s optimal choice of signal structure is closely
related to the concave closure V̂i of Vi, the smallest concave function that is everywhere
weakly greater than Vi. In particular, the sender benefits from an information structure
that reveals some information (i.e. that sometimes induces posterior beliefs that differ from
the prior) if and only if the concave closure is greater at the prior, V̂i(µ̂; τj) > Vi(µ̂; τj).
The concave closure also illustrates the support of optimal signal structures (i.e. optimal
distributions of posteriors). On any region on which V̂i diverges from Vi, it forms a convex
combination of points of Vi. For the region containing the prior, those points indicate the
posteriors that support an optimal signal, as any Bayes-plausible mix of them will yield an
expected payoff of V̂i(µ̂; τj).
Useful special cases arise when the original function Vi is concave or convex in µj. In the
former case V̂i = Vi and an entirely uninformative signal structure is optimal. In the latter
case V̂i coincides with Vi only at the endpoints of its domain - that is, at certainty about the
true cost, implying that a fully revealing signal structure is optimal.


























The dual role of µj in firm i’s expected payoff is represented by two distinct effects in the
derivatives. The first, difference term in each derivative results from the shift in the condi-
tional probability of firm i having cost cl that a change in µl represents. This is the own-type
effect. The second term represents the expected changes to firm i’s payoff as equilibrium
production levels shift with µj. This is the equilibrium-action effect.
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It is illuminating to consider the second derivative of Vi in terms of the firms’ second-stage








can be written in terms of the derivatives of ui with respect to the other firm’s action, qj.
Further, the equilibrium second-stage actions q∗i and q
∗
j are linear in the posterior beliefs, so
∂2q∗j
∂µ2j



































is negative (an increased probability that firm i has low costs causes firm j
to reduce output) and ∂ui
∂qj
= −q∗i is increasing in ci (when firm i has low costs, its output is
higher, so the negative impact of an increase in firm j’s production has greater magnitude).
So the own-type effect is positive. As for the equilibrium-action effect, here it consists only
of an ‘adjustment’ effect (if actions were not linear in beliefs it would be more complicated,
as later examples will demonstrate). Firm i responds to the increase in firm j’s belief and
resulting decrease in firm j’s output by increasing its own output (
∂q∗i
∂µj
> 0), which in turn












Since both effects are positive, clearly Vi is convex in µj regardless of firm j’s choice of
signal structure τj, and it is a dominant strategy for firm i to choose a completely revealing
information structure. The intuition is reasonably straightforward. Firm i always benefits
from an increase in firm j’s belief that ci is low. This benefit is increasing in firm j’s belief,
because firm i observes the information firm j receives and can adjust its own output upwards
accordingly. The ex ante expectation of the benefit is increasing in the conditional probability
that firm i actually does draw low costs, because in that case firm i’s output will be higher
and it will benefit more from a reduction in firm j’s output. So firm i is willing to allow firm
j to learn that its costs are high when it draws high costs, in order to have firm j learn that
its costs are low the rest of the time.
3.3 General Model
Environment: There are two players, a set of payoff types Θ = {1, 2}, and a common
prior µ̂ ∈ ∆Θ. Each player independently draws a payoff type θi, but the types are initially
unknown to either player. Each player i chooses a signal structure τi which determines how
the other player, j, learns about player i’s payoff type. Each player also chooses an action ai
from a closed interval A = [0, Ā].
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Payoffs are given by a function u : A2 × Θ → R. When I use this function to represent a
given player’s payoffs, I will typically use a subscript to indicate which player’s payoffs it
represents; for example, ui(ai, aj, θi) for the payoffs of player i when they draw payoff type θi
and take action ai, and their opponent takes action aj. This is purely for notational clarity,
and should not be taken to indicate that, say, ui and uj represent different functions - players
are ex ante identical and ui(a, a
′, θ) = uj(a, a
′, θ) for any a and a′ in A and any θ in Θ.
Signal Structures: Player i’s choice of signal structure τi determines the information that
player j receives about player i’s payoff type. There is a finite set of messages M , Θ ⊆M . A
signal structure τi : Θ→ ∆M that selects a probability distribution over the set of messages
for each of the possible payoff types player i could draw. Denote the set of all possible signal
structures by T . Note that T is the Cartesian square of the |M |-simplex.
Timing: The players participate in a game G with the following structure:
1. First stage: The players choose signal structures. The choices are simultaneous and
the chosen signal structure is observed by the other player.
2. The players’ payoff types are independently drawn. Each player observes their own
payoff type, and the messages generated by each signal structure.
3. The players update their beliefs about the other player’s payoff type using Bayes’
rule, based on the message they received and the properties of their opponent’s signal
structure. The resulting posterior belief of player i is denoted µi.
4. Second stage: The players choose their actions simultaneously and receive their pay-
offs.
Strategies: The players make their second-stage action choice having observed the choice
of signal structures, their own type draw, and the messages generated by the two signal
structures4. A second-stage strategy for player i is a function si2 : T
2 ×M2 × Θ→ A. I
write a second-stage strategy as si2(τi, τj,mi,mj, θi), where mi is the message player i receives
(generated by the signal structure τj). Denote the set of all such functions by S2. A first-
stage strategy si1 is an element of ∆T . A strategy si for the entire game G is an element
of ∆T × S2.
Equilibrium: The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. A pair of strategies
(si, sj) is an equilibrium of G if and only if each si maximises player i’s ex ante expected
utility given sj (and likewise for player j), and sequential rationality holds for the second-
stage strategies si2 and sj2. If µi(τj,mi) is the posterior belief of player i having received
message mi from signal structure τj, then sequential rationality for a second-stage strategy
si2 requires that:








4The message player j receives about player i’s type is relevant to player i’s action because it informs
player i of player j’s posterior belief.
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Following the terminology of Koessler et al. (2020), define a strategy si as Markovian if the
second-stage strategies included in si do not depend on the messages received beyond the

















j, θi). In this case si2 can
be written as si2(µi, µj, θi). A strategy profile or equilibrium is Markovian if the strategies it
consists of are Markovian.
For Markovian strategy profiles, the sequential rationality condition can be rewritten in terms
of the posterior beliefs:









Markovian second-stage strategy profiles that meet this condition can be thought of as spec-
ifying Bayes-Nash equilibria for each of a set of second-stage games, where a second-stage
game Gs(µi, µj) is a Bayesian game in which the action space is A, payoffs are given by u,
players learn their own payoff type before acting, and the common prior on the payoff types
is (µi, µj).
Proposition 1. If u is continuous in ai and aj and there exist Markovian second-stage
strategies si2 and sj2 such that:
• the sequential rationality condition (3.1) is satisfied for si2 given sj2 and vice versa
• si2 and sj2 are continuous in the posteriors µi and µj
then G has a Markovian equilibrium in which the second-stage strategies are si2 and sj2.
Proof. Consider the reduced first-stage game Ḡ(si2, sj2) that results from fixing the (Marko-
vian) second-stage strategies si2 and sj2 and allowing the players to choose first-stage strate-
gies. Clearly if si2 and sj2 satisfy sequential rationality, any equilibrium of Ḡ is a Markovian
equilibrium of G. The posterior induced by a message from player i’s signal structure,
µj(τi,mj), is continuous in τj (except where P (mj) = 0). If u is continuous in actions and
si2 and sj2 are continuous in the posterior beliefs, then it follows that the expected payoffs
of the players are continuous in τi and τj. Since T is compact and convex, Ḡ(si2, sj2) has a
mixed-strategy equilibrium by the existence theorem of Glicksberg (1952).
Proposition 1 essentially states that if there exist equilibria for all the possible second-stage
games which are continuously related (in posterior beliefs), then there exists a Markovian
equilibrium for the overall game. For payoff structures that meet this condition, this demon-
strates existence without relying on the possibility of correlated equilibrium as in Koessler
et al. (2020). Games in which a Markovian equilibrium exists are also of particular inter-
est, because focusing on such equilibria ensures that the first-stage strategies depend only
on the effects of communicating information about the player’s payoff type (in a Markovian
equilibrium, the first-stage choice of signal structure is not serving to provide a correlating
or equilibrium-selection device for second-stage play). In the next section, I consider a class
of payoff structures that ensure the conditions of Proposition 1 are met.
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3.3.1 Second-stage games with belief-continuous equilibria
I will now focus on a class of second-stage games characterised by three assumptions on the
payoff function u:
Assumption 1 (concavity): Payoffs are strictly concave in a player’s own action: for any
ai and aj in A and any θi in Θ,
∂2ui
∂a2i
(ai, aj, θi) < 0.
Assumption 2 (partial cross-effect linearity): For any θi in Θ, the cross-effect
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj




Assumption 3 (own-action dominance): The own-action second-derivative of payoffs at
some action pair is larger in magnitude than the cross-effect. That is, there exists k ∈ (0, 1)









Assumptions 1 and 3 yield a unique equilibrium for a game of complete information (such as
the second-stage games with both posteriors equal to 0 or 1, in which payoff types are common
knowledge), by a standard contraction mapping result5. The following results demonstrate
that along with assumption 2, they are sufficient to guarantee unique and belief-continuous
equilibria for all second-stage games, ensuring that a Markovian equilibrium of the over-
all game exists and allowing analysis without concerns over the selection of second-stage
equilibria.
Lemma 1. If the payoff function u satisfies Assumptions 1-3, then for any pair of posterior
beliefs (µi, µj) the second-stage game GS(µi, µj) has a unique, pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Consider some second-stage game GS(µi, µj). A strategy âi for player i is an action
for each possible type draw, θi. By Assumption 1 and the compactness of A, given a strategy
aj for player j, there is a unique best-response â
∗
i :






Applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order condition for interior values of âi
∗














5See e.g. chapter 2 of Vives (1999)
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, t ∈ [0, 1]




Now consider the best-response mapping â∗i , and denote â
∗
i (ât) by â
∗
t . Note that for any



























) < k ∈ (0, 1)







′). This demonstrates that â∗i is a contraction and has a unique fixed point, yielding
a unique equilibrium of GS(µi, µj).
Given the existence of a unique equilibrium for each GS, the equilibrium second stage strategy
of player i can be written as a function a∗i (µi, µj, θi). To simplify notation, I will write a profile




Lemma 2. If the payoff function u satisfies u satisfies Assumptions 1-3, the equilibrium
actions a∗i (µ, θi) and a
∗
j(µ, θj) are continuous in µi and µj, and when interior, they are
differentiable in µi and µj. Consequently, a Markovian equilibrium of the whole game exists
by Proposition 1.












Consider a function G : A4 × [0, 1]2 → R4 giving the own-action first derivative of expected
utility (i.e. the left-hand side of the above first-order condition) for each player-type pair. By
the implicit function theorem, the equilibrium actions are given by functions differentiable
6This does not account for corner solutions to player i’s problem at which the first-order condition does
not apply (a∗i = Ā or a
∗





not always exist, left and right derivatives do exist, and are either zero or given by the interior expression
stated in the proof.
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in µi and µj if the Jacobian of G with respect to the actions, DaG, is invertible. The
determinant of the Jacobian is given by:
|DaG| = 1− Eµi,µj
















This is positive by Assumptions 2 and 3.
This demonstrates that equilibrium actions are given by differentiable functions when the
actions fall on the interior of A. On a region where some actions fall on the interior of A
and some do not, an analogous argument applies to show that the interior actions are still
given by differentiable functions7. Equilibrium actions will not typically be differentiable at a
point where one or more equilibrium actions reach the boundary of A (that is, points at which
an equilibrium action falls on the boundary but the first-order condition is still satisfied),
but they will be continuous at such points as they are given by differentiable functions in a
neighbourhood around the point, which must have the same limit at that point (the unique
equilibrium).
The consequence of this result is that the first-stage information design problem in games
that meet Assumptions 1-3 can be analyzed by considering the derivative of a player’s ex-
pected payoff conditional on managing to induce a particular belief in their opponent, as this
expected payoff is differentiable in beliefs when the equilibrium actions are.
3.3.2 First-stage best responses and the ex-ante value of
posteriors
Consider player i’s best response to a Markovian strategy sj = (sj1, sj2). Define player i’s
interim value function V̄i and ex-ante value function Vi as follows:
V̄i(µj;µi, sj2) = Eµj max
ai∈A
(








The ex-ante value function gives player i’s expected payoff conditional on sending a message
that induces the posterior µj, given that the opponent’s strategy is sj. This is an expectation
over the interim value function, which additionally conditions player i’s expected payoff
on the value of their own posterior, µi. Note that these definitions rely on the fact that
the distribution of θi conditional on sending a µj-inducing message is simply µj; hence the
expectations with respect to µi and µj in the above expressions.
7The preceding argument can be applied to generate differentiable functions that satisfy only first-order
conditions for player-type pairs with interior equilibrium actions, while fixing the other actions at Ā or 0.
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Player i’s expected payoff given a first-stage strategy choice is simply the resulting expectation
over Vi. That is, first-stage best responses to sj, ŝi(sj), are given by:






Lemma 3. Denote by V̂i(µj; sj) the concave closure of Vi in µj, as defined in Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011). If Vi(µj; sj) is continuous in µj, the expected payoff of player i when









Proof. Given that Vi assigns a value to each µj player i can induce, and that continuity
implies upper semicontinuity, player i’s problem can be taken as an instance of the sender’s
problem in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Equivalent results follow.
Since Lemma 2 implies the continuity of Vi for games that satisfy Assumptions 1-3, Lemma
3 demonstrates that the problem of best-responding in the first stage of such games can be
treated as a Bayesian Persuasion problem, which allows for the application of other useful
results from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
It will be useful to consider benchmark information structures that either fully reveal a
player’s type, or disclose no information beyond the prior. Denote by s̄0 a fully-concealing
information structure under which P (m = 1|θ = 1) = 1 and P (m = 1|θ = 2) = 1 (the
posterior induced by this structure is always the prior, µ̂). Denote by s̄1 a fully-revealing
information structure under which P (m = 1|θ = 1) = 1 and P (m = 2|θ = 2) = 1 (this
structure reveals the player’s type to the opponent, leading to a posterior of either 0 or 1).
Corollary 3. If Vi(µj; sj) is convex in µj, s̄1 ∈ ŝi(sj), with ŝi(sj) = {s̄1} if it is strictly
convex. Similarly, if Vi(µj; sj) is concave in µj, s̄0 ∈ ŝi(sj), with ŝi(sj) = {s̄0} if it is strictly
concave.
First-stage equilibria for a given game can be sought by investigating the ex-ante value
function, and the underlying interim value function. In particular, a fully-concealing equi-
librium in which both players choose s̄0 in the first stage will exist if there exist sequen-
tially rational second-stage strategies (si2, sj2) such that V̄i(µj; µ̂, sj2) and V̄j(µi; µ̂, si2) are
both concave. Similarly, a fully-revealing equilibrium will exist if there exist sequentially
rational second-stage strategies (si2, sj2) such that µ̂V̄i(µj; 1, sj2) + (1 − µ̂)V̄i(µj; 0, sj2) and
µ̂V̄j(µi; 1, si2)+(1−µ̂)V̄j(µi; 0, si2) are both convex. This investigation is most straightforward
when V̄i is differentiable in µj (which implies that Vi is as well), and convexity or concavity
can be established based on the sign of ∂
2Vi
∂µ2j
. Differentiability follows when the second-stage
strategies are differentiable; as discussed in Section 3.3.1, for games that meet Assumptions
1-3 this is the case for the unique second-stage equilibrium actions, except at points at which
they reach the boundaries of A.
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In such cases, the discussion of the second-derivative in the Cournot case in Section 3.2
generalises, and the direct and own-type effects identified for that application can be identified
in the more general case. When considering games that meet Assumptions 1-3, the unique
second-stage equilibria can be taken as fixed when considering the first stage, and the interim





a∗i (µi, µj, θi), a
∗
j(µj, µi, θj), θi
))
The second derivative is:
∂2V̄i(µj;µi)
∂µ2j
= Di(µi, µj) + Ii(µi, µj)
where D(µi, µj) is the equilibrium-action effect and I(µi, µj) is the own-type effect.
The equilibrium-action effect is given by:
































This effect is the second-order impact on player i’s expected payoff of a shift in player j’s
beliefs about player i’s payoff type, holding constant the conditional distribution of player
i’s type. If player i could manipulate player j’s belief through some deceptive means (if they
could increase player j’s belief that they drew type 1 given a particular message without
actually altering the information structure determining when that message would be sent),
then this would be the change in the benefit they derive as µj increases. The first two terms
give the second-order effect of the change in player j’s action on player i’s expected payoff,
and the third term is the impact that the shift in player i’s equilibrium action has on the
first-order effect of a change in player j’s action.
The own-type effect is given by:














This effect is the second-order impact on player i’s expected payoff of a shift in the conditional
distribution of their type. As µj increases, a
∗
j changes, which has an impact on player i’s
expected payoff - however, the magnitude and direction of this impact, ∂ui
∂aj
will (typically)
vary depending on player i’s type, both directly through a different type representing a
different payoff structure, and indirectly in that ∂ui
∂aj
may depend on player i’s own choice of




shifts is a second-order effect on player i’s ex-ante expected payoff.
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The definitions of these effects show that optimal choices of information structure in the first
stage depend on the structure of the payoff function u for each of the possible type draws
(that is, on the various derivatives of u), and on the way that equilibrium actions respond to
changes in the posterior beliefs (the derivatives of a∗i and a
∗
j with respect to µj). In principle,
the latter can be expressed in terms of the former for any game meeting the assumptions
of section 3.3.1. In the next section, I will focus on a class of games in which doing so is
relatively straightforward, and demonstrate how different forms of uncertainty lead to various
kinds of first-stage equilibria.
3.4 Quadratic games
Consider a payoff function of the following form:
ui(ai, aj, θ) = zθiai − 12yθia
2
i + xθiaiaj +H(aj, θi) zθi > 0, yθi > 0
Here zθi , yθi , and xθi are constants for a given payoff type θi, and do not vary with actions,
while H(aj, θi) is a function that does not depend on ai and is twice-differentiable in aj. The
H function can be thought of as an externality that player j exerts on player i, an impact
of aj on player i’s payoff that is independent of player i’s choice of action. I will refer to a
game in which payoffs take this form as a quadratic game.




Quadratic games satisfying this assumption are particularly tractable in that equilibrium
actions (when interior) and their derivatives can be solved for and an explicit expression for
∂2V̄i(µj ;µi)
∂µ2j
in terms of the parameters can be derived, as in the Cournot example of Section








Additionally, I will denote by θ′i the payoff type that player i did not draw. That is, if θi = 1,
θ′i = 2, and vice versa.
The first-order conditions that apply to interior equilibrium actions in a quadratic game are
of the form:




Solving the resulting system of equations gives:
a∗i (µ, θi) =













































these games, beginning with the own-type effect:
Ii(µi, µj) = 2
Eµi(ρθj)
(








































Making use of these expressions allows for consideration of particular forms of uncertainty,
by constraining which parameters vary across the payoff types. I begin with a result that
encompasses the full-revelation result described for homogeneous Cournot duopoly with cost
uncertainty in Section 3.2.
Proposition 2. For a quadratic game with interior equilibrium actions for every second-stage
game, if the cross-effect does not vary with payoff type (x1 = x2) and:
• either y1 = y2 and H(aj, 1) ≡ H(aj, 2)




then as long as either y or z does vary with payoff type, a fully-revealing signal strictly
dominates all first-stage strategies that are not fully-revealing, and consequently payoff types
are revealed in any equilibrium.
Proof. Recall that:





This expression is increasing in zθi and decreasing in yθi (since a
∗
i (µ, θi) > 0 by assumption).
It follows that (z1 − z2)(y1 − y2) ≤ 0 and one or both of z1 6= z2 or y1 6= y2 holding implies
that a∗i (µ, 1)− a∗i (µ, 2) is nonzero for any beliefs.
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Assume that y1 = y2 = y and H(aj, 1) ≡ H(aj, 2). In this case x1 = x2 = x implies that








The own-type effect similarly reduces to:
2x2y−1
(




Now assume instead that (z1 − z2)(y1 − y2) ≤ 0 and ∂H(aj ,1)∂aj ≡
∂H(aj ,2)
∂aj
≡ 0. Since (y1 − y2)












)2((a∗i (µ, 1)− a∗i (µ, 2))(y−11 − y−12 )Eµj(a∗i (µ, θi))
+
(







Since (z1 − z2)(y1 − y2) ≤ 0 implies that (a∗i (µ, 1)− a∗i (µ, 2)) and (y−11 − y−12 ) have the same
sign, all terms in the above expression are positive.













It follows that under either set of assumptions, V̄i(µj;µi) is strictly convex in µj for any µi,
and that s̄1 strictly dominates any first-stage strategy that is not fully revealing (i.e. one that
puts positive probability on a message that induces a posterior µj not equal to 0 or 1).
The Cournot example of Section 3.2 clearly falls under this result, with H = 0, y1 = y2 = 2,
x1 = x2 = −1, z1 = 1 − cl and z2 = 1 − ch. It also follow that the conclusion extends
to non-homogenous goods, whether substitutes or complements (other values of x) and to
quadratic costs if the linear and quadratic components of costs are positively correlated.
That is, if the cost function has the form:
ci(qi) = αθiqi + βθiq
2
i
then full revelation will result if whenever the firm has a higher α it also has a higher β, since
in this case zθi = 1− αθi and yθi = 2(1 + βθi).
However, in a setting in which the linear and quadratic components of costs are negatively
correlated (i.e. the two possibilities are that a firm has a marginal cost function with a high
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intercept but low gradient, or one with a low intercept but high gradient) Proposition 2 does
not apply and full revelation may not be the result. The next result demonstrates that V̄
can potentially be concave in such cases.





≡ 0 such that for some µ̄ ∈ [0, 1], V̄i(µj; µ̄) is strictly concave in µj.
Consequently, for some prior µ̂ = µ̄ there exists an equilibrium of that game in which both
players choose a fully-concealing information structure in the first stage.
Proof. I will show that a game with the required properties can be constructed by fixing
parameters other than z1 and considering the properties of the resulting games as z1 varies.





































1 − y−12 )
)
Note that, assuming interior solutions for the moment:
a∗i (µ, 1)− a∗i (µ, 2) =































)y−12 < 1, and it
follows that for a given µi, there is a value of x below which the above derivative is positive
(any negative x will suffice). Alternatively, for any given x there is a value of µi below which
the derivative is positive.
Note also that if z1 = z2, then:
a∗i (µ, 1)− a∗i (µ, 2) =
z2(y
−1






Note further that assuming that x > −y2
y1
(this is sufficient to guarantee a∗i positive in this
case) and that Ā is larger than the maximum a∗i ensures that these equilibrium actions are
interior.
So parameters can be chosen such that the difference in actions a∗i (µ, 1)−a∗i (µ, 2) is negative
when z1 = z2 and is strictly linearly increasing in z1. This implies the existence in such a
case, for any given µj, of a value z̄ > z2 such that when z1 = z̄, a
∗
i (µ, 1) − a∗i (µ, 2) = 0, as
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long as Ā is sufficiently large that the resulting values of a∗i are less than Ā for any µ (since
a∗i (µ, 1) is increasing in z1 and can be assumed positive at z1 = z2, the lower bound at 0 is
not a concern).
In fact, z̄ must be the same for all values of µj. To see this, note that if player i plays
a strategy in which they select the same action regardless of payoff type, player j’s best
response does not depend on µj. If player j’s action does not vary with µj, player i’s best
response also does not depend on µj. It follows that if such a strategy for player i forms part
of an equilibrium for some second-stage game GS(µi, µj), then that equilibrium is also an
equilibrium of any other GS(µi, µ
′
j) for any µ
′
j ∈ [0, 1]. It then follows from the uniqueness of
second-stage equilibria that for a given µi there is a unique z̄ at which a
∗
i (µ, 1)− a∗i (µ, 2) = 0
for any µj.
Clearly when z1 = z̄,
∂2V̄i(µj ;µi)
∂µ2j






















a∗i (µ, 1)− a∗i (µ, 2)
))
< 0
It follows that there exists an ε such that when z1 ∈ (z̄, z̄ + ε), ∂
2V̄i(µj ;µi)
∂µ2j
< 0 for any µj.
The proof of Proposition 3 also demonstrates that for games with (y1 − y2)(z1 − z2) > 0,
V̄i is sometime convex and sometimes concave in µj
8. Why do such games differ from the
always-convex cases laid out in Proposition 2?
The difference lies in the equilibrium-action effect. The own-type effect is still always positive
in the games described by Proposition 3, because with constant x and no externalities, both
player j’s response to a shift in µj,
∂a∗j
∂µj
, and the shift in the effect of that response on player





, are given their sign by the product of
the cross-effect x and the difference in player i’s action across types, a∗i (µ, 1) − a∗i (µ, 2). If
actions are strategic complements, for example, and player i’s action is higher when they are
type 1, it follows that both player j’s expected action and the expectation of the benefit to
player i of an increase in that action are increasing in µj.
The equilibrium-action effect, however, can be negative in games with (y1− y2)(z1− z2) > 0,






























8Convex examples can be constructed by noting that for any given y1, y2 with y1 6= y2 and x1 = x2 = x
such that the equilibrium actions are interior, V̄i is strictly convex at z1 = z2, and therefore also strictly
convex when z1 falls in some neighborhood [z2 − ε, z2 + ε].
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If, for example, we assume that y1 − y2 > 0, but z1 − z2 is sufficiently large that a∗i (µ, 1) −
a∗i (µ, 2) > 0, then the two components of the above product will have opposite sign. If it is a
game of strategic complements (x > 0), the expected effect of an increase in aj on ui will be
positive but a∗j will be concave in µj, from
∂a∗j (µ,θj)
∂µj
> 0 and (y−11 − y−12 ) < 0. Similarly, if it
is a game of strategic substitutes the expected impact will be negative but aj will be convex.
The explanation for this lies in the denominator of the expressions for a∗j and its derivatives,
1 − Eµi(ρθj)Eµj(ρθi). This term can be thought of as a ‘feedback’ effect on the equilibrium
actions. When player j’s belief µj shifts, the response in their equilibrium action is not only
due to the shift in their belief about which of the two actions a∗i (µ, 1) and a
∗
j(µ, 2) player i will
take, but also to their understanding that player i observes the shift in µj and understands
that player j’s action will change, shifting their own actions accordingly. This amplifies the
change in equilibrium actions given a change in belief compared to a situation in which the
change was hidden from the other player9. Note that if the change in µj was hidden from
player i, player j’s best response would change linearly in µj.
The feedback effect depends on ρ because ρ represents the responsiveness of a player to a




So in the case, for example, in which x > 0, y1 > y2, and z1 > z2, a
∗
j can be increasing
but concave in µj because while an increase in µj can represent an increase in Eµj(a
∗
i ) when
z1 − z2 is large enough, this effect is itself decreasing in µj because as µj increases, Eµj(ρθi)
falls - player j’s expectation of player i’s responsiveness to the change in a∗j is falling, which
in turn reduces the rate of increase in a∗j itself. Proposition 3 demonstrates that there are
cases in which this effect outweighs the own-type effect (and the other, positive component
of the equilibrium-action effect), leading to a concave V̄i and an incentive for the players to
conceal information.
3.4.1 Externalities
In the cases I have considered up to this point, I have essentially assumed away the ‘ex-
ternality’ component of the payoff function, H(aj, θi). In this section I will consider the
effects of some straightforward (linear and quadratic) externalities that vary across payoff
types, which will also illustrate how linear cost uncertainty in Bertrand duopoly leads firms
to conceal information.
9It can also subdue the change if Eµi(ρθj ) and Eµj (ρθi) have opposite sign, ruled out here but possible
in some cases discussed later in this paper.
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Linear Externalities and Bertrand Competition
I begin with linear externalities, of the form:
H(aj, θi) = hθiaj
Externalities do not affect equilibrium actions10, but they do impact ∂
2V̄
∂µ2j
. Compared to some





















It is clear that for a game with no externalities in which V̄ is always concave or convex,
leading to equilibria with full revelation or no revelation, there are corresponding games with
externalities that reverse those outcomes. The next result formalizes this for the case in
which payoff types differ only in z and h; recall that without externalities (uncertainty over
z only) these settings lead to full revelation by Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. For a quadratic game with linear externalities, interior equilibrium actions
for every second-stage game, and x1 = x2, y1 = y2, a fully-concealing signal strictly dominates







Conversely, a fully-revealing signal strictly dominates all first-stage strategies that are not







Proof. For a game meeting the conditions given in the statement of the proposition, combin-
10Note that the model does not allow players to choose not to participate and receive an outside option.
Externalities would potentially impact such a decision, and for the conclusions of this section to apply the
externalities would have to be assumed sufficiently small not to do so. In the Bertrand interpretation I give
later in this section, this is not a concern, as in that case a non-negative payoff is always achievable for a
firm, so a zero-payoff shutdown option would not have an impact.
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The conditions in the proposition follow straightforwardly from the sign of this expression.
Bertrand duopoly with linear demand and uncertainty over marginal costs falls under the
scope of this result. Consider two firms in a duopolistic market choosing prices pi and facing
a demand function:
qi = 1− αpi − βpj
If costs are linear, with marginal cost ci, the resulting payoff function for firm i is:
ui(pi, pj, ci) =
(
1− αpi − βpj
)
(pi − ci), α > 0, |β| ≤ α
Assuming that marginal costs are uncertain and taking on a value of c1 or c2 then yields a
quadratic game with:
y = 2α x = −β zθi = 1 + αcθi h(aj, θi) = βcθi








This holds by the assumption that |β| ≤ α, so the unique equilibrium is that both firms
conceal their costs.
This matches results in the information sharing literature11, but it also serves to illuminate
the properties of this particular case that drive the outcome. Consider a Bertrand duopoly
with complementary goods, β > 0. In terms of second-stage equilibrium outcomes, this is
structurally equivalent to a Cournot duopoly with goods that are substitutes; in both cases,
actions are strategic substitutes. However, in the Cournot case the marginal effect of firm j’s
action on firm i’s payoff depends on firm i’s type only through firm i’s equilibrium action,
where in the Bertrand case it depends on marginal revenue, (pi − ci), which varies directly
with type even if the action pi is held fixed. An increase in the conditional probability that
ci is high implies a higher expected pi, leading firm j to reduce pj, which is to firm i’s benefit
- but this benefit is falling as that probability rises, because when firm i draws high costs
11Gal-Or (1985), Raith (1996), and Amir, Jin and Troege (2010) all give results in which concealment of
cost information is chosen by firms in Bertrand oligopoly.
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their price is higher but their marginal revenue, and consequently the marginal benefit they
derive from a fall in pj, is lower. This leads to a concave V̄ and a preference for concealing
information.
It is the relationship between a firm’s cost and its marginal revenue in equilibrium that is
crucial here; note the reliance on the parameter restriction that |β| < α. This restriction is a
reasonable one for the setting (it is typically derived from the assumption that a representative
consumer has strictly concave utility), but if there were some structurally similar setting in
which it did not apply, the full-concealment result would be reversed if |β| ∈ ( 2√
3
α, 2α).
Quadratic Externalities and Partially-Revealing Equilibria
In the various types of quadratic game I have considered up to this point, equilibria have
involved either full concealment or full revelation. I now give an example in which u exhibits
a quadratic externality that demonstrates the existence of games in which the unique equi-
librium involves neither fully-concealing nor fully-revealing first-stage strategies. Consider a
quadratic game with the following payoff function:
ui(ai, aj, θi) = zθiai − aiaj − a2i + kθia2j
Assume that z2 < z1 < 2z2, which guarantees strictly positive equilibrium actions. Note that




































For k1 < k2 the inequality is reversed. For any given z1 and z2, it is straightforward to find
values of k1 and k2 such that this threshold falls in (0, 1), implying that V̄i is convex for some
values of µj and concave for others.
However, this is not in itself sufficient to demonstrate that a partially-revealing equilibrium
exists. Fully-revealing and fully-concealing signals may still be best responses when the value
function a player faces has both convex and concave segments. By Lemma 3, the value of
player i’s best response to a Markovian strategy sj is given by the value at the prior of V̂i,
the concave closure of Vi, where Vi is the expectation of V̄i given sj. Assume that there is
some value µ̄j such that Vi is strictly concave in µj for µj < µ̄j and strictly convex in µj for
µj > µ̄j, as is possible in the k1 > k2 case. In this case we can write V̂i piecewise as:
V̂i(µj; sj) =
{















Vi(1, sj)− Vi(µ∗j ; sj)
1− µj
Recall that the value of a best response to sj is given by the value of V̂i(µ̂; sj) where µ̂ is the
common prior. If µ̂ < µ∗, then V̂i(µ̂; sj) = Vi(µ̂; sj) and the best response is a fully-concealing
signal. Otherwise, V̂i(µ̂; sj) is achieved through a signal that mixes between posteriors of 1
and µ∗. If µ∗ = 0 this is a fully-revealing signal, but if µ∗ > 0 it is partially-revealing.
In the case under consideration here, it is possible to solve for µ∗. Assuming µ∗ > 0,







a∗i (µi, 1, 1),a
∗




























Substituting the solutions for equilibrium actions into the payoff function reduces this to a





− 7 + 4k1
8(k1 − k2)
)
Note that by the ‘Bayes plausibility’ condition on the distribution of posteriors induced by
an information structure, as described in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), it must be that
Esj1(Eµi(zj)) is equal to the prior expectation of zj for any sj1, so the following holds for V̂i









If the parameters and the prior µ̂ are such that µ∗j is positive and µ
∗
j < µ̂, then each player
will have a partially-revealing dominant strategy in the first-stage that mixes the opponent’s
posterior between 1 and µ∗j , and the the game will have a partially-revealing equilibrium.














It is straightforward to find games for which this holds; in fact, for any given prior and values
of z1 and z2 (which determines second-stage play), one can find externalities k1 and k2 that
lead to partially-revealing play in the first stage.
3.4.2 Cross-Effect Uncertainty
I now turn to games in which there is uncertainty over the cross-effect, xθi . In these games
players are initially uncertain about how the interaction between their own action and the
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opponent’s action affects their payoff. This uncertainty may be over the magnitude of the
effect, or over its direction (for player i, whether player j’s action is a strategic complement
or strategic substitute).
The games I consider in this section only involve uncertainty over the x parameter, and do
not include externalities. Given this, I normalise y to 1 in order to simplify exposition, so
payoffs have the form:
ui(ai, aj, θi) = zai + xθiaiaj − a2i
I begin with a result that fleshes out the assumption of interior equilibrium actions for this
type of games by noting what it implies about the parameters x1 and x2.
Lemma 4. If a quadratic game with y1 = y2 = 1, z1 = z2, x1 > x2, and no externalities has
interior equilibrium actions for every second-stage game, then x1 < 1 + x2.


















It follows that if equilibrium second-stage actions are always interior, the following must hold
for any posteriors µ:





For x1, x2 > 0 this always holds as Eµi(xθj)Eµj(xθi) < 1 by Assumption 3. For x1, x2 < 0 the
minimum value of the left-hand side is 1 + x2 < 0, so the inequality always holds in this case
as well. For x1 > 0, x2 < 0, the left-hand side is minimized when Eµi(xθj) = Eµj(xθi) = x1,
which gives:





1 + x2 > x1
The next result deals with uncertainty over the magnitude of the cross-effect: when actions
are known to be strategic complements and the only uncertainty is over the magnitude of
the complementarity, full revelation is the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 5. For a quadratic game with y1 = y2, z1 = z2, and x1 > x2 > 0, a fully-
revealing signal strictly dominates all first-stage strategies that are not fully-revealing, and
consequently payoff types are revealed in any equilibrium.
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)2 (1 + (x1 + x2)( 1 + Eµi(xθj)1− Eµi(xθj)Eµj(xθi))
)
> 0













Since both effects are positive, V̄i is strictly convex for any beliefs. It follows that revealing
information is a strictly dominant first-stage strategy.
The logic here is somewhat similar to that of the Cournot with cost uncertainty case of Section
3.2, although there is an equilibrium-action effect component present that was absent there.
When the strategic complementarity effect on player i’s payoff is larger, the benefit to player
i of an increase in player j’s action rises, both directly through the increased magnitude of
the cross-effect and because player i’s own equilibrium action rises. When player j believes
that the effect is larger (for player i), this raises player j’s equilibrium action, since actions
are strategic complements. So an increase in µj benefits player i through player j’s increased
action, and this benefit is itself increasing in µj because of the increase in the conditional
expectation of ∂ui
∂aj
= xθiai. So the own-type effect creates convexity and an incentive to
reveal.
As to the equilibrium-action effect, in these games a∗j is convex in µj because of the ‘feedback
effect’ described in the discussion of 3; as player j’s expectation of xθi rises, so does the
degree to which they expect player i to respond to an increase in player j’s action, leading
to higher-order effects on a∗j . Since
∂ui
∂aj
is positive with strategic complements, this convexity
in a∗j creates a positive component in the equilibrium-action effect
12.
There is no equivalent result for games in which there is uncertainty over the magnitude of
a negative cross-effect (strategic substitutes). It is still the case that a higher value of xθi
implies a higher a∗i , but with xθi < 0
∂ui
∂aj
= xθiai is decreasing in a
∗
i , so the overall own-type
effect has indeterminate sign - when player i is type 1 the negative impact of an increase in
aj is reduced because x1 > x2, but increased because a
∗
i (µ, 1) > a
∗
i (µ, 2).
The equilibrium-action effect is similarly variable. Player j’s action is convex in µj as in
the strategic-complements case, but since ∂ui
∂aj
< 0 the corresponding component is negative.
Since the component based on the change in player i’s equilibrium action is always negative,
the sign of the overall effect is indeterminate.











, is always positive in quadratic games.
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This implies that with strategic substitutes either convexity or concavity of V̄i is possible,
and that is indeed the case; it depends on the parameter values and beliefs, so no general
conclusion is possible. Numerical tests suggest that no-disclosure equilibria exist (in contrast
to the case of strategic complements) for many parameter values and priors, but combinations
of values also exist for which only partially-revealing equilibria are possible.
What of uncertainty as to the direction of the cross-effect? The general case of x1 > 0 > x2
is similarly variable, but a more tractable subset of these games can be found by focusing
on cases in which the uncertainty is purely about direction, rather than magnitude; that is,




by Lemma 4. The next result sets out conditions under which fully-revealing
and fully-concealing equilibria exist in such games, and demonstrates that for some priors,
both of these outcomes are equilibria, as well at least one partially-revealing equilibrium.
Proposition 6. For any quadratic game with y1 = y2 = 1, z1 = z2, no externalities, x1 =
−x2, and interior equilibrium actions for every second-stage game, there exists µ̄ ∈ (0, 12)
such that:
• There exists an equilibrium in which both players play fully-revealing first-stage strate-
gies if and only if µ̂ ≥ µ̄
• There exists an equilibrium in which both players play fully-concealing strategies if and
only if µ̂ ≤ 1
2
(that is, if the prior expectation of xθ is negative).
• For µ̄ < µ̂ < 1
2
, both fully-revealing and fully-concealing equilibria exist. Additionally,
at least one symmetric equilibrium exists in which first-stage strategies are neither fully-
revealing nor fully-concealing.
Proof. Write x1 = x, and note that Assumption 3 and interior actions together imply that
x ∈ (0, 1
2
). I begin by showing that V̄i is concave if and only if Eµi(xθj) ≤ 0. Combining the









)4 Φ(µi, µj, x)
where:












is clearly determined by the sign of Φ(µi, µj, x). The sign of Φ(µi, µj, x)
is in turn determined by the sign of Eµi(xθj). This is clear when Eµi(xθj) ≥ 0, as 1 −
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Eµi(xθj)Eµj(xθi) > 0. When Eµi(xθj) < 0, we have:
max
µj
Φ(µi, µj, x) = Eµi(xθj)
(



















where the second line follows from x < 1
2
.
When player j plays a fully-concealing first-stage strategy s̄0, player i’s ex-ante value function
is Vi(µj; s̄0) = V̄i(µj, µ̂). This is concave if and only if Eµ̂(xθj) ≤ 0, which is equivalent to
µ̂ ≤ 1
2
. It follows that both players playing a fully-concealing strategy is an equilibrium if
and only if this condition holds.
When player j plays a fully-revealing first-stage strategy, s̄1, player i’s ex-ante value function
is:




















The term in parentheses here can be shown to be positive by an argument parallel to that




> 0 for any prior, so Vi(µj; sj1) is either convex, concave, or switches
from concave to convex at some intermediate value of µj and is concave below that threshold
and convex above it.
In the latter case in which Vi switches from concave to convex, it follows that (as discussed
for games with quadratic externalities in Section 3.4.1) the concave closure of Vi(µj; sj1),
V̂i(µj; sj1) can be written as:
V̂i(µj; sj1) =
{




Vi(1; sj1) + (1− µj)Vi(µ∗j ; sj1)
)
µj ≥ µ∗j







Vi(1, s̄1)− Vi(µ∗j ; s̄1)
1− µj
Given this structure for V̂i(µj; sj1), a best response for player i must only put positive prob-
ability on two values of µj, 1 and µ
∗
j . Define:




Given the structure described above for the concave closure, a fully-revealing first-stage
equilibrium will exist if and only if:
ν(0, µ̂, s̄1) ≥ 0
This condition is necessary and sufficient because it also holds whenever Vi(µj; s̄1) is convex
and does not hold when it is concave.
The function ν(0, µ̂, s̄1) is linear in µ̂ by the linearity of expectations, negative for µ̂ = 0 since
V̄i(µj, 0) is concave, and positive for µ̂ = 1 since V̄i(µj, 1) is convex. Therefore there exists
µ̄ ∈ (0, 1) such that ν(0, µ̄, s̄1) = 0 and a fully-revealing equilibrium exists for µ̂ ≥ µ̄.
I now show that µ̄ < 1
2
by showing that ν(0, 1
2












2x2(1 + x)2(1− 4x+ 4x3 − 4x4)
(1− x)2(1 + x2)2
+
16x5(1 + x+ x2)
(1 + x2)3(1 + x)2(1− x2)
− 8x
4(1 + 2x4)
(1 + x2)3(1 + x)2(1− x2)
The above is positive for any x < 1
2
.
These results demonstrate that if µ̂ ∈ (µ̄, 1
2
), both players playing s̄1 and both players playing
s̄0 are equilibria. Recall that best responses in the first stage here are mixes between 1 and
some posterior, say µp. Abusing notation slightly, write sj1 = µp to indicate that sj1 is an
information structure that mixes between posteriors of 1 and µp. Now consider the function
ν(µp, µ̂, µp) - that is, the value of the function ν at a posterior that mirrors player j’s strategy.
If ν(µp, µ̂, µp) = 0, then there is a symmetric equilibrium in which both players use an
information structure that mixes between 1 and µp. The function ν(µp, µ̂, µp) is continuous
in µp, and the results above imply that for µ̂ ∈ (µ̄, 12), we have ν(0, µ̂, 0) > 0 (fully-revealing
strategy is the best response to a fully-revealing opponent) and ν(1, µ̂, 1) < 0 (Vi is concave
when opponent conceals). By the intermediate value theorem, it follows that there exists a
µp ∈ (0, 1) such that ν(µp, µ̂, µp) = 0, and a partially revealing equilibrium exists.
This result demonstrates the range of possible outcomes for the information sharing games
I have described in this paper. In particular, it shows how the straightforward dominant-
strategy equilibria found in the linear cost-uncertainty oligopoly examples can give way to
more complex outcomes when the scope of uncertainty varies and makes the variation in equi-
librium actions and the impact of that variation on payoffs nonlinear and/or non-monotonic.
This may not even require uncertainty over the cross-effect. Proposition 3 demonstrates
the possibility of fully-concealing equilibria in Cournot oligopoly with uncertainty over some
kinds of quadratic cost functions, but the parameter ranges that make the ex-ante value
function V̄i concave in that case depend on player i’s posterior µi, so it is not guaranteed to
be convex for all first-stage strategies of the opponent, and multiple equilibria may exist for
such games as well - an interesting open question for future work on this topic.
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